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Dicey and the Brick Maker: An Unresolved Tension Between the Rational and the Reasonable in Common Law Pedagogy
Liverpool Law Review Pub Date : 2019-08-17 , DOI: 10.1007/s10991-019-09228-w
Shivprasad Swaminathan

In his inaugural address as the Vinerian Professor of English law in 1883, Albert Venn Dicey laid down the vision for a new pedagogy for the common law to replace the ‘unaccountable’ arrangement of apprenticeship that had hitherto served the common law. The latter, he likened to ‘brick making’. At the heart of Dicey’s vision was the idea that the common law be cognized as a system of rules and exceptions—in contrast to the classical common lawyers’ self-understanding which took it to be a practice of reasoning—which could then, like other sciences, be expounded and taught by the newly emerging professoriate. Dicey pitched this as supplementing the ‘brick maker’ with a knowledge of the science underlying his craft. This article argues that Dicey’s rationalist pedagogical vision, however, fundamentally altered the very nature of the common lawyers’ enterprise since it was based on a philosophical model opposed to the one the common lawyers’ traditional self-understanding presupposed. On the rationalist model (which Dicey presupposes), the common law is seen as being comprised of standards—with precedents being seen as rules—which it is the task of legal reasoning to bring to bear upon the case. On the reasonableness model—which is how David Hume, along with the common lawyer, understood the common law—the task of legal reasoning is to have a motivational traction on the community and precedents are rhetorical counters that serve to persuade the interlocutor.

中文翻译:

Dicey 和砖匠:普通法教育学中理性与合理之间未解决的紧张关系

阿尔伯特·维恩·戴西 (Albert Venn Dicey) 在 1883 年作为英国法 Vinerian 教授的就职演说中提出了新的普通法教学法的愿景,以取代迄今为止为普通法服务的“不负责任”的学徒制安排。后者,他比作“制砖”。Dicey 愿景的核心是认为普通法是一个规则和例外的系统——与古典普通法的自我理解相反,后者将其视为一种推理实践——然后可以像其他人一样科学,由新出现的教授进行阐述和教授。Dicey 将此作为对“砖匠”的补充,以了解其工艺背后的科学知识。然而,本文认为 Dicey 的理性主义教学观,从根本上改变了普通律师事业的本质,因为它基于一种与普通律师传统的自我理解所预设的哲学模型相反的哲学模型。在理性主义模型(Dicey 假设)中,普通法被视为由标准组成——先例被视为规则——法律推理的任务是对案件施加影响。在合理性模型上——这就是大卫休谟和普通律师理解普通法的方式——法律推理的任务是对社区产生动机牵引,先例是用于说服对话者的修辞反驳。在理性主义模型(Dicey 假设)中,普通法被视为由标准组成——先例被视为规则——法律推理的任务是对案件施加影响。在合理性模型上——这就是大卫休谟和普通律师理解普通法的方式——法律推理的任务是对社区产生动机牵引,先例是用于说服对话者的修辞反驳。在理性主义模型(Dicey 假设)中,普通法被视为由标准组成——先例被视为规则——法律推理的任务是对案件施加影响。在合理性模型上——这就是大卫休谟和普通律师理解普通法的方式——法律推理的任务是对社区产生动机牵引,先例是用于说服对话者的修辞反驳。
更新日期:2019-08-17
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