© 2017 Jeremy Waldron, published by De Gruyter Open. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License. Of course what one wants, in a volume like this, is a reply not by me but by Justice Scalia himself to the assessments and criticisms offered in these six essays. Sadly, that is impossible, and I shall not attempt in my comments here to channel Antonin Scalia or to say what I think he would or should have said. Nor can I respond to everything in the essays presented here. They pursue a variety of themes in a variety of ways, some focusing on the distinctive features of Scalia’s own approach to adjudication, some focusing on patterns of judicial decision-making in which he has participated substantially, but often as one justice among others. Jane Marriott’s discussion of campaign finance is an example here; as she notes, Scalia has “rarely authored a majority campaign finance opinion for the Court.”1 Some are assessments of patterns of dissent (for example, Ian Loveland’s discussion of the sexual orientation cases) rather than Scalia’s participation in the actual crafting of Court decisions (James Pfander’s essay on the law of standing is an example). Brian Jones and Austin Sarat are convinced that Justice Scalia became, in the eyes of many people, a “sacred symbol” in the higher judiciary—one of a long and romantic line of “brilliant and elegant philosopher judge[s]” that include Sir Edward Cook, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis.2 There was a sense that his death posed a particular crisis for conservatives, not just because it might change the balance on the Court but because it meant the loss of an icon of judicial conservatism, one whose presence had had a transformative impact on American adjudication. I am not sure I would use the term “sacred symbol,” even on the definition given at the end of this essay.3 Its use by Jones and Sarat is a little confusing since they associate it with the fact that Justice Scalia revealed and humanized his personality as a judge rather than making himself into a mere mouthpiece of a particular jurisprudence.4 If there was something sacred in his jurisprudence, it was his readiness to desacralize the pieties of his colleagues. If he was an icon, it was in the midst of his iconoclasm. He wrote clearly, straightforwardly, and unequivocally about what seemed to him to be at stake both in particular cases but also and above all in the theory and ethos of interpretation. Also, as Jim Allan emphasizes,5 Justice Scalia made himself more than usually available for

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后记：原始主义和司法权威

©2017 Jeremy Waldron，De Gruyter Open出版。该作品已根据知识共享署名-非商业性-NoDerivs 3.0许可获得许可。当然，在这样的数量中，人们想要的不是我而是斯卡利亚法官本人对这六篇论文中所提供的评估和批评的答复。令人遗憾的是，这是不可能的，我将不会在这里发表自己的意见，以传达安东宁·斯卡利亚（Antonin Scalia）或说出我认为他会或应该说的话。我也无法对此处介绍的文章做出任何回应。他们以各种方式追求各种主题，其中一些侧重于斯卡利亚自己的审判方法的鲜明特征，一些侧重于他大量参与的司法决策模式，但通常是其中之一。Jane Marriott关于竞选融资的讨论就是一个例子。正如她指出的那样，斯卡利亚“很少为法院撰写多数党竞选财务意见。” 1有些是对异议模式的评估（例如，伊恩·洛夫兰对性取向案件的讨论），而不是斯卡利亚参与了法院的实际制定工作决定（詹姆斯·芬德（James Pfander）关于地位法的论文就是一个例子）。布赖恩·琼斯（Brian Jones）和奥斯汀·萨拉特（Austin Sarat）相信，在许多人看来，斯卡利亚大法官已成为高级司法机构中的“神圣象征”，这是包括“爵士先生”在内的漫长而浪漫的“灿烂而优雅的哲学家法官”系列中的一员。爱德华·库克（Edward Cook），奥利弗·温德尔·福尔摩斯（Oliver Wendell Holmes）和路易·布兰代斯（Louis Brandeis）。2有人认为，他的死给保守派带来了特别的危机，不仅因为它可能会改变法院的平衡，而且还因为它意味着失去了司法保守主义的标志，而后者的存在对美国的裁决产生了革命性的影响。我不确定即使在本文结尾处给出的定义，我也不会使用“神圣的象征”一词。3Jones和Sarat的使用有点令人困惑，因为他们将其与Scalia法官揭示并人性化的事实联系在一起。他作为法官的个性，而不是仅仅使自己成为某个判例的代言人。4如果他的判例中有神圣的东西，他愿意废除同事的虔诚。如果他是一个偶像，那是在他的偶像崇拜之中。他写得很直接 毫无疑问，在特定情况下，尤其是在解释理论和精神方面，他似乎都面临着什么风险。另外，正如吉姆·艾伦（Jim Allan）所强调的那样，5