Abstract Robert Natelson recently published his article, The Founders’ Origination Clause and Implications for the Affordable Care Act, in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. This article argued the original understanding of the scope of the Senate’s power to amend the House of Representatives’ bills for raising revenue in the Origination Clause permits complete substitutes that are new bills for raising revenue, such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). The original understanding of a constitutional word or provision is what the ratifiers of the Constitution thought was the meaning of the word or provision. When the Senate originated PPACA as an amendment to the House’s Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, the Senate replaced the entire House bill, except for the bill’s number, with PPACA. I consider the original public meaning—not the original understanding—of a constitutional word or provision, unless unrecoverable, to be the controlling meaning of that word or provision. The original public meaning is the meaning that a “reasonable speaker of English” during the founding era would have ascribed to the word or provision. My article argues the original public meaning of amendment is clear and disallows complete substitutes. For instance, founding-era dictionaries indicate an amendment was a change or alteration to something that transformed the thing from bad to better. This definition suggests an amendment must not be a complete substitute because an amendment must preserve at least a part of the thing being amended so that there is something to transform from bad to better. My article further argues the preponderance of evidence suggests the original understanding of the scope of an amendment actually disallows complete substitutes. For example, much evidence from the Philadelphia Convention, Confederation Congress, state legislatures, and state conventions suggests the dominant view among the founders was that an amendment to the Articles of Confederation, the legal compact between 13 states enacted in 1781, could not be a complete substitute. My conclusion argues PPACA or any other such complete substitute violates the original public meaning of the scope of an amendment.

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修改条款中的原始公共含义与《患者保护和负担得起的医疗法案》

摘要罗伯特·纳特尔森（Robert Natelson）最近在《哈佛法制与公共政策杂志》上发表了他的文章《创始者的原始条款及其对可负担医疗法案的影响》。本文提出了对参议院修改众议院在起源条款中增加收入的法案的权力范围的最初理解，它允许完全替代作为提高收入的新法案的法案，例如《患者保护和负担得起的医疗法案》（PPACA） ）。宪法字词或规定的最初理解是宪法的批准者认为该字词或规定的含义。当参议院发起PPACA作为对2009年众议院《服务成员房屋所有权税法》的修正时，参议院用PPACA代替了整个众议院法案，但法案编号除外。我认为，除非无法恢复，否则构成词语或规定的原始公共含义（而不是最初的理解）是该词语或规定的控制含义。原始的公共含义是指在创始时期“合理的英语使用者”将其归因于该词或规定。我的文章认为，修正案的原始公共含义是明确的，不允许完全替代。例如，开国时期的词典表明修正案是对事物的改变或变更，使事物从坏变为更好。该定义表明，修正案不能完全替代，因为修正案必须保留至少一部分要修正的内容，以便可以将某些情况从不良变为更好。我的文章进一步指出，大量证据表明，对修正案范围的最初理解实际上不允许完全替代。例如，费城公约，联邦制议会，州议会和州制公约的大量证据表明，创立者的主要观点是，《联邦条款》的修正案（1781年制定的13个州之间的法律契约）不可能完全替代。我的结论认为，PPACA或任何其他此类完全替代品违反了修订范围的原始公共含义。各州的公约表明，创立者的主要观点是，对《联邦条款》的修正（不能完全替代），该修正案是1781年颁布的13个州之间的法律契约。我的结论认为，PPACA或任何其他此类完全替代品违反了修订范围的原始公共含义。各州的公约和惯例表明，创始人的主要观点是，对《联邦条款》的修正案（一项于1781年制定的13个州之间的法律契约）不能完全替代。我的结论认为，PPACA或任何其他此类完全替代品违反了修订范围的原始公共含义。