In the mid-1990s, the world’s most successful jihadi group – the group that came closest to overthrowing an Arab regime – was Algeria’s Groupe islamique arme (Armed Islamic Group, GIA). Here I argue that the GIA was the first major armed group to prioritize adherence to Salafi theology over the jihadi strategic objective of building a “big tent.” The GIA used the vocabulary of Salafism to justify killing rivals and would-be allies and eventually turned against the Algerian population itself. In part one, I re-read GIA sources, particularly the group’s London-based newsletter Al-Anṣār, to show how the GIA sidelined potential allies in the name of purity. In parts two and three, I examine the effects of this approach. Through analysis of counter-texts by the GIA’s ideological and theological rivals, I demonstrate how their rejection of the GIA sharpened disagreements about what it meant to be a Salafi-jihadi.

中文翻译：

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阿尔及利亚的 GIA：第一个将圣战主义完全服从萨拉菲主义的主要武装团体


在 1990 年代中期，世界上最成功的圣战组织——最接近推翻阿拉伯政权的组织——是阿尔及利亚的伊斯兰武装集团（Armed Islam Group，GIA）。在这里，我认为 GIA 是第一个将坚持萨拉菲神学置于建立“大帐篷”的圣战战略目标之上的主要武装团体。GIA 使用萨拉菲主义的词汇来为杀害竞争对手和潜在的盟友辩护，并最终转而反对阿尔及利亚人民本身。在第一部分中，我重新阅读了 GIA 的资料来源，尤其是该组织在伦敦的时事通讯 Al-Anṣār，以展示 GIA 如何以纯洁的名义将潜在盟友排除在外。在第二部分和第三部分，我会检查这种方法的效果。通过分析 GIA 意识形态和神学竞争对手的反文，