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Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation in Hegel and Rawls
Ratio Juris ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2018-09-01 , DOI: 10.1111/raju.12219
Carsten Fogh Nielsen 1 , Emily Hartz 2
Affiliation  

At the heart of any theoretical problem of justice lies the problem of motivation: Even if we could conceive of a way to develop a comprehensive system of just laws, and even if we could rationally believe in the justice of these laws, how could we ever ensure that we—or anyone else—would be motivated to abide by them? By unearthing how the problem of motivation sways canonical discussions of justice, the article brings forth intrinsic similarities and differences in these discussions that are often overlooked in the literature. In particular, the article highlights intrinsic similarities in the analysis of the concept of justice in two central works that belong to the continental and the analytic tradition respectively and are otherwise rarely discussed together: Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Right and Rawls’s Theory of Justice.

中文翻译:

为什么公正?黑格尔和罗尔斯的动机问题

正义的任何理论问题的核心都在于动机问题:即使我们可以构想出发展一套全面的正义法律体系的方法,即使我们可以理性地相信这些法律的正义,我们又如何确保我们或其他任何人都愿意遵守这些原则?通过发掘动机问题如何影响对正义的规范讨论,本文提出了这些讨论中的内在相似点和不同点,而这些讨论在文献中经常被忽略。特别是,这篇文章着重强调了在分别属于大陆和分析传统的两部核心著作中对正义概念的分析的内在相似性,这两部著作分别是黑格尔的《权利哲学纲要》和罗尔斯的正义论。
更新日期:2018-09-01
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