Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.

中文翻译：

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理论上的分歧，法律实证主义和解释

罗纳德·德沃金（Ronald Dworkin）著名地指出，法律实证主义是对法律的有缺陷的解释，因为它没有对理论分歧的解释。在本文中，我认为HLA Hart提出的法律实证主义不需要解释理论分歧。但是，法律实证主义确实需要对法律解释进行合理的解释。我在本文中提供了这样一个帐户。