This article advocates limiting the permissive impact of military necessity on the right to life. It has been argued that military necessity justifies deviations from international human rights law (IHRL) because this body of law is inadequate to deal with the necessities arising out of armed conflict. The article argues that while this rationale is convincing, it should not mean that conduct that is lawful under humanitarian law is necessarily also lawful under human rights law. The degree of force that may be used under international humanitarian law (IHL) is often superfluous. In some instances such violence is tempered by thejus ad bellum, but this body of law does not apply in internal non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The article concludes by exploring the potential for IHRL to play a role in tempering superfluous violence in NIAC that is similar to that whichjus ad bellumplays in international conflict.

中文翻译：

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重新思考军事必要性在国内非国际武装冲突中的许可功能

本文主张限制军事必要性对生命权的许可影响。有人认为，军事必要性证明偏离国际人权法 (IHRL) 是正当的，因为该法律体系不足以处理武装冲突引起的必要性。文章认为，尽管这一理由令人信服，但这并不意味着根据人道法合法的行为在人权法下也一定是合法的。根据国际人道法（IHL）可能使用的武力程度通常是多余的。在某些情况下，这种暴力行为会因诉诸战争权，但该法律体系不适用于国内非国际性武装冲突 (NIAC)。文章最后探讨了 IHRL 在缓和 NIAC 中的多余暴力方面发挥作用的潜力，这类似于诉诸战争权在国际冲突中发挥作用。