This book discusses the compliance of ASEAN Member States [AMSs] with their obligations in the ASEAN agreements they have ratified. Despite consisting of only three chapters, this book presents comprehensive and critical analyses on the evolution of monitoring obligations in ASEAN. The book provides a complete assessment, as it provides a deep review of ASEAN’s approach to monitoring its three communities: the ASEAN Economic Community [AEC], the Political Security Community, and the Socio-Cultural Community. It also addresses in detail the purpose of monitoring, including compliance sensu stricto, implementation, interpretation, facilitation, and symbolism. The analysis is supported with several figures, appendices, treaties, and ASEAN agreement links, as well as indexes that enable readers to more easily digest the book. In discussing and analyzing ASEAN’s approach to and purposes in monitoring its three communities, the book evaluates the gathering of information with regard to compliance with, and implementation of, certain obligations. The book also suggests some structural possibilities for ASEAN. For example, an agent who monitors ASEAN compliance could be “an independent body empowered to investigate or evaluate and, if necessary, enforce compliance” (p. 61). The last part of the book adds several operating tools related to monitoring compliance, such as how data are collected, when monitoring takes place, what powers monitors have, and how transparent the mechanism is. The topic of the book is both interesting and demanding, insofar as AMSs have so far preferred diplomacy to legalism as they apply the ASEAN Way in all co-operation sectors. It can be said that ASEAN’s compliance is somewhat lacking, as there are merely AMS commitments instead of legal sanctions. For example, AMS compliance with the 2007 AEC Blueprint was considerably weak. Not all AMSs have fully complied with the Blueprint, whose term of application ended in December 2015. The AEC scorecard measures are not fully implemented by all AMSs. As of 31 October 2015, the overall implementation rate by all ten AMSs stood at 92.7 percent, or 469 out of 506measures. The first and second pillars—the single market and production base and the competitive economic region —had not been fully implemented compared to the third and fourth pillars of the AEC Blueprint. This unsatisfactory result made these pillars immediate priorities of AMSs, and they are now part of a continued programme of the AEC Blueprint 2025. Furthermore, there is “the political resistance to binding obligations generally” (p. 98) in ASEAN, even though the ASEAN Charter that had been agreed to and ratified by AMSs clearly asserts that “We, the People of the Member States of the Association... [h]ereby decide to establish, through this Charter, the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN”.

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国际法的历史和理论。从社区到合规？西蒙·切斯特曼的《东盟监督义务的演变》剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2015年，xv +180页。平装：US $ 62。

本书讨论了东盟成员国遵守其已批准的东盟协定中的义务的情况。尽管仅由三章组成，但本书对东盟监测义务的演变进行了全面而严格的分析。这本书提供了完整的评估，因为它对东盟监视其三个社区的方法进行了深入的回顾：东盟经济共同体，政治安全共同体和社会文化共同体。它还详细介绍了监视的目的，包括合规性，实施，解释，简化和象征意义。几个图，附录，条约和ASEAN协议链接以及使读者能够更轻松地阅读本书的索引，为分析提供了支持。在讨论和分析东盟对三个社区的监控方法和目的时，本书评估了有关遵守和履行某些义务的信息。该书还提出了东盟的一些结构性可能性。例如，监督东盟遵守情况的代理人可以是“有权调查或评估并在必要时强制执行情况的独立机构”（第61页）。本书的最后一部分增加了一些与监视合规性相关的操作工具，例如如何收集数据，何时进行监视，监视器具有什么功能以及机制的透明性。本书的主题既有趣又要求很高，因为迄今为止，AMS在所有合作领域都应用ASEAN方式，因此他们倾向于外交而不是法制。可以说，由于缺乏AMS承诺而不是法律制裁，因此在某种程度上缺乏东盟的合规性。例如，AMS对2007 AEC蓝图的合规性很弱。并非所有AMS都完全遵守该蓝图，该蓝图的申请期限于2015年12月结束。并非所有AMS都完全实施AEC计分卡措施。截至2015年10月31日，所有十个AMS的总体实施率为92.7％，即506项措施中的469项。与AEC蓝图的第三和第四支柱相比，第一和第二支柱-单一市场和生产基地以及竞争性经济区域-尚未得到充分实施。这一令人不满意的结果使这些支柱成为了AMS的当务之急，现在它们已成为AEC 2025蓝图的持续计划的一部分。