States have a multitude of tools for territorial dispute resolution at their disposal ranging from direct bilateral negotiations to third-party states to international organizations (IOs). While the literature explores when states are more likely to accept a third party in their negotiations and when they are more likely to seek a resolution to their disputes bilaterally, we have little understanding of why states are more likely to seek IOs for such tasks. We examine the disputants that prefer certain conflict managers, with a focus on the distinguishing characteristics of IO-led conflict management. We derive a set of hypotheses based on our expectations that, due to the institutional and multilateral characteristics of IOs, certain states will turn to them to resolve their disputes while others will avoid them. Using the Issue Correlates of War data, we find support for our hypotheses. We conclude that the institutional and multilateral characteristics of negotiations indeed affect states’ conflict resolution choices.

中文翻译：

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多边机构和冲突解决

各国拥有多种解决领土争端的工具，从直接双边谈判到第三方国家再到国际组织 (IO)。虽然文献探讨了国家何时更有可能在谈判中接受第三方以及何时更有可能寻求双边解决争端，但我们对为什么国家更有可能为此类任务寻求 IO 知之甚少。我们研究了喜欢某些冲突管理器的争论者，重点是 IO 主导的冲突管理的显着特征。我们根据我们的预期得出一组假设，即，由于 IO 的制度和多边特征，某些国家会求助于他们来解决争端，而另一些国家则会回避。使用“战争相关问题”数据，我们找到了对我们假设的支持。我们得出的结论是，谈判的制度和多边特征确实会影响国家解决冲突的选择。