The idea of public reason requires that citizens in their public deliberation employ considerations stemming from a shared conception of justice. One worry is that public reason's content will be incomplete, in that it does not contain sufficient material for adequate public debate. Rawls has a way of expanding the content of public reason to address such concerns—by including in public reason all those things you and I say in our justification of the conception of justice. After arguing that this strategy fails, a new way of expanding public reason's content is proposed. Instead of understanding the Supreme Court—which Rawls famously calls the “exemplar” of public reason—as an institution that appeals to exogenously determined public reasons, we should understand the judicial authority in a liberal democratic society as an endogenous fountain of public reason.

中文翻译：

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最高法院是公共理性的源泉

公共理性的理念要求公民在他们的公共审议中采用源于共同的正义概念的考虑。一种担忧是公共理性的内容将是不完整的，因为它没有包含足够的材料来进行充分的公共辩论。罗尔斯有一种方法可以扩展公共理性的内容来解决这些问题——通过在公共理性中包含你我在我们对正义概念的辩护中所说的所有事情。在论证了这一策略失败后，提出了一种扩展公共理性内容的新途径。与其将最高法院——罗尔斯称之为公共理性的“典范”——理解为诉诸外生决定的公共理性的机构，