Numerous legal scholars have adopted the view that H. L. A. Hart offered an expressivist (or at least proto-expressivist) account of legal discourse. But philosophers of law have given comparatively little attention to the prospect of developing newer forms of legal expressivism informed by contemporary metaethics. One notable exception is Kevin Toh, who has recently addressed this constructive project. This article critically evaluates Toh's contributions to the project of legal expressivism. Despite the value of Toh's work in reviving legal expressivism as an explanatory strategy in jurisprudence, neither he nor anyone else has paid sufficient attention to the most important question now facing legal expressivists. I call this the “question of content”: to wit, what distinguishes the mental states expressed by legal statements from the mental states expressed in other forms of normative discourse? I argue that theorists interested in legal expressivism must prioritize this question.

中文翻译：

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法律表现主义的新方向

许多法律学者都接受了这样的观点，即 HLA Hart 提供了一种表达主义（或至少是原始表达主义）法律话语的解释。但法哲学家相对较少关注发展受当代元伦理学启发的新形式的法律表现主义的前景。一个值得注意的例外是 Kevin Toh，他最近谈到了这个建设性项目。本文批判性地评估了卓对法律表现主义项目的贡献。尽管卓的工作在复兴法律表现主义作为法理学的解释策略方面具有价值，但无论是他还是其他任何人都没有对法律表现主义者现在面临的最重要问题给予足够的关注。我称之为“内容问题”：也就是说，法律陈述所表达的精神状态与其他规范话语形式所表达的精神状态有何区别？我认为对法律表现主义感兴趣的理论家必须优先考虑这个问题。