Law being a derivative feature of reality, it exists in virtue of more fundamental things, upon which it depends. This raises the question of what is the relation of dependence that holds between law and its more basic determinants. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that grounding is that relation. We first make a positive case for this claim, and then we defend it from the potential objection that the relevant relation is rather rational determination.1Against this challenge, we argue that the apparent objection is really no objection, for on its best understanding, rational determination turns out to actually be grounding. Finally, we clarify the framework for theories on law-determination that results from embracing our view; by way of illustration, we offer a ground-theoretic interpretation of Hartian positivism and show how it can defuse an influential challenge to simple positivist accounts of law.

中文翻译：

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作为基础的法律确定：法学的共同基础框架

法律是现实的派生特征，它凭借更基本的事物而存在，它依赖于这些事物。这就提出了一个问题，即法律与其更基本的决定因素之间的依赖关系是什么。本文的主要目的是论证接地就是这种关系。我们首先为这一主张提出一个积极的理由，然后我们为它辩护，反对潜在的反对意见，即相关关系是相当理性的决定。1针对这一挑战，我们认为表面上的反对实际上是没有反对，因为根据最好的理解，理性的决定实际上是有根据的。最后，我们澄清了接受我们观点的法律决定理论框架；通过说明的方式，我们提供了对哈特实证主义的基础理论解释，并展示了它如何化解对简单实证主义法律解释的有影响力的挑战。