2018 marked the centenary of Wesley Hohfeld's untimely passing. Curiously, in recent years quite a few legal historians and philosophers have identified him as a Legal Realist. This article argues that Hohfeld was no such thing, that his work need not be understood in such lights either, and that he in fact made a smaller contribution to jurisprudence than is generally believed. He has nothing to do with theories of official decision-making that identify, among other things, “extra-legal” factors as the real drivers of judicial decision-making, nor must his schema of jural relations advance a “Realist” political agenda. Distinguishing Hohfeld from the Realists will help to correct some misunderstandings about his work and point to its utility in many more contexts than a Realist reading of it allows.

中文翻译：

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霍菲尔德VS。法律现实主义者

2018 年是 Wesley Hohfeld 英年早逝的百年纪念。奇怪的是，近年来，不少法律史学家和哲学家将他认定为法律现实主义者。这篇文章认为，霍菲尔德不是这样的人，他的工作也不需要从这样的角度来理解，事实上他对法学的贡献比人们普遍认为的要小。他与官方决策理论毫无关系，这些理论将“法律外”因素确定为司法决策的真正驱动因素，他的法律关系图式推进“现实主义”政治议程。将霍菲尔德与现实主义者区分开来将有助于纠正对他的作品的一些误解，并指出其在更多情况下的实用性，而不是现实主义阅读所允许的。