While significant efforts have been made to reform the criminal justice system across Latin America, we do not know the conditions under which reform effectively deters homicide, one of many goals of the reform. Drawing on a novel sub-national design in Mexico, I find that criminal procedure reforms aimed at improving due process are not sufficient for deterring homicide in places where non-state actors (i.e. drug cartels) effectively challenge the state’s monopoly of violence. I argue that in these settings, citizens are less willing to cooperate with the formal system of justice - despite reform efforts. Without society cooperation, the prosecution is less equipped to investigate, prosecute, and solve crime, resulting in impunity and little deterrence. Importantly, where the state maintains its monopoly of violence, reform is associated with less homicide. In selecting remedies to combat violent crime, therefore, different communities need to pursue different strategies, suggesting that the State can deter violence through fairness.

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刑事诉讼改革及其对凶杀的影响：来自墨西哥的证据

虽然拉丁美洲为改革刑事司法系统做出了重大努力，但我们不知道改革在何种条件下能有效阻止凶杀，而凶杀是改革的众多目标之一。借鉴墨西哥的新地方设计，我发现旨在改善正当程序的刑事诉讼改革不足以在非国家行为者（即贩毒集团）有效挑战国家对暴力的垄断的地方阻止凶杀。我认为，在这些情况下，公民不太愿意与正式的司法系统合作——尽管进行了改革。如果没有社会合作，检察机关侦查、起诉和破案的能力就会降低，从而导致有罪不罚和威慑力不足。重要的是，在国家保持对暴力的垄断的情况下，改革与减少凶杀案有关。因此，在选择打击暴力犯罪的补救措施时，不同的社区需要采取不同的策略，这表明国家可以通过公平来阻止暴力。