In this article, two case studies of large-scale bid rigging in the construction industry in Canada and the Netherlands are analysed to explore why business cartels sometimes do and sometimes do not involve organised crime. By combining concepts from both organised crime and organisational crime, an integrated understanding of the organisation of serious crimes for gain is applied. Across time and space, businesses in the construction industry are known to fix prices, use collusive tendering and divide market shares in illegal cartel agreements. In order to stabilise cartels, participants need to ward off new competitors and prevent cheating within the cartel. The question why we see a system of collusion involving organised crime and violence in Canada as opposed to the Netherlands is answered through analysing two comparable cases. This article finds two systems of bid rigging emerge under different cultural conditions: inclusive and exclusive collusion. The exclusive system makes use of the violent reputation provided by criminal groups and distinguishes from the inclusive system that uses sophisticated administration of mutual claims in shadow bookkeeping.

中文翻译：

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商业卡特尔和有组织犯罪：排他性和包容性的勾结系统

在本文中，分析了加拿大和荷兰建筑业大规模操纵投标的两个案例研究，以探讨为什么商业卡特尔有时涉及有组织犯罪，有时不涉及有组织犯罪。通过结合有组织犯罪和有组织犯罪的概念，可以综合理解为谋取利益而组织的严重犯罪。众所周知，建筑行业的企业会跨越时间和空间固定价格、使用串通招标并在非法卡特尔协议中瓜分市场份额。为了稳定卡特尔，参与者需要抵御新的竞争者并防止卡特尔内部的作弊。为什么我们看到加拿大而不是荷兰存在涉及有组织犯罪和暴力的勾结制度的问题通过分析两个可比案例得到了回答。本文发现在不同的文化条件下出现了两种操纵投标制度：包容性和排他性共谋。排他性系统利用犯罪集团提供的暴力声誉，并区别于在影子簿记中使用复杂的相互索赔管理的包容性系统。