This article evaluates the effects of violence related to the operations of drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) on electoral competition, defined by the number of electoral alternatives or candidates in Mexico’s municipal elections. I find that the killing and threatening of politicians, which are effective tools to influence politics, jeopardizes competition in violent Mexican municipalities by reducing the number of candidates. This result is not only probabilistically robust but also meaningful. The number of candidates can fall to one in the more violent municipalities. However, DTOs can also provide (illegal) funding to politicians to facilitate their candidacies. I find that as confrontation intensifies among DTOs, the negative effect of violence on electoral competition moderates. This finding suggests that DTOs finance candidates to capture municipal governments when facing intense competition and attacks from other DTOs. In addition, DTOs in this context may also provide protection to their preferred candidates from other competing organizations. These factors temper the negative effect of violence on electoral competition.

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暴力和选举竞争：墨西哥的犯罪组织和市政候选人

本文评估了与贩毒组织 (DTO) 的运作相关的暴力对选举竞争的影响，选举竞争由墨西哥市政选举中的备选选举人或候选人的数量来定义。我发现杀害和威胁政客是影响政治的有效工具，通过减少候选人数量来危及墨西哥暴力城市的竞争。这个结果不仅在概率上是稳健的，而且是有意义的。在暴力程度更高的城市，候选人的数量可能会降至 1。然而，DTO 也可以向政治家提供（非法）资金以促进他们的候选资格。我发现，随着 DTO 之间的对抗加剧，暴力对选举竞争的负面影响有所缓和。这一发现表明，在面临来自其他 DTO 的激烈竞争和攻击时，DTO 会资助候选人以夺取市政府。此外，在这种情况下，DTO 还可以为其他竞争组织的首选候选人提供保护。这些因素缓和了暴力对选举竞争的负面影响。