While there has been extensive discussion in the antitrust literature on the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of joint ventures, there is a lack of systematic analysis on the potential of a joint venture to have collusive harm beyond its home market. This article aims to fill the gap in the literature by systematically accounting for the possible ways in which a joint venture can facilitate collusion by its members outside of the venture’s home market, namely: (i) as a punitive mechanism for the cartel; (ii) as a provider of an important input; and (iii) as a facilitator of information exchange. In addition to discussing these theories of harm, this article will attempt to offer some ways in which such anticompetitive concerns raised by joint ventures can be alleviated or addressed under US antitrust law, including ex ante behavioural remedies and ex post conduct enforcement. The proposals are intended to preserve the efficiency-enhancing potential of joint ventures by permitting them as long as their collusion facilitating potential can be reasonably contained.

中文翻译：

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一个被忽视的危害理论：合资企业作为跨市场勾结的促进者

虽然在反垄断文献中对合资企业的促进竞争和反竞争影响进行了广泛的讨论，但缺乏对合资企业在其本国市场之外造成共谋损害的可能性的系统分析。本文旨在通过系统地解释合资企业促进其成员在合资企业本国市场之外勾结的可能方式来填补文献中的空白，即：(i) 作为对卡特尔的惩罚机制；(ii) 作为重要投入的提供者；(iii) 作为信息交流的促进者。除了讨论这些损害理论之外，本文还将尝试提供一些方法，可以根据美国反垄断法减轻或解决合资企业提出的此类反竞争问题，包括事前行为补救和事后行为执法。这些提议旨在通过允许合资企业保持其提高效率的潜力，只要可以合理抑制其共谋促进潜力。