The article reviews loyalty rebates, target rebates, exclusive dealing, and bundling, and argues that these are analogous practices that deserve similar competitive analyses and rules. In particular, in the case of all of these practices, at least some marginal units are typically sold below cost. The article shows that the analyses and rules that should apply to all of these practices ought not to depend on their labels, but rather on the monopoly power of the supplier engaged in the practice; whether, in the particular case, exclusion is costless or almost costless; the size of the sanction that the buyer suffers from being disloyal to the monopolist, and whether the sanction makes it impossible for the monopolist’s as efficient rivals to compete for the buyer; the degree of market foreclosure, including its effective duration; the presence or absence of any efficiency justifications, and whether the discount is expected to be passed on to consumers. The analysis further highlights how exclusion may well be costless, or almost costless and can be achieved when the monopolist has non-price means of coercing buyers to be loyal. Further, intermediate cases are explored, in which exclusion, though not entirely costless, is nevertheless cheaper to the monopolist than ordinary predatory pricing.

中文翻译：

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忠诚度折扣、独家交易和捆绑：理性规则、准本身、价格成本测试，还是介于两者之间？

文章回顾了忠诚回扣、目标回扣、独家交易和捆绑销售，并认为这些类似的做法值得类似的竞争分析和规则。特别是，在所有这些做法的情况下，至少一些边际单位通常以低于成本的价格出售。文章表明，适用于所有这些做法的分析和规则不应取决于它们的标签，而应取决于从事这种做法的供应商的垄断力量；在特定情况下，排除是无成本的还是几乎无成本的；买方因对垄断者不忠而遭受的制裁的大小，以及制裁是否使垄断者作为有效的竞争对手无法与买方竞争；市场止赎的程度，包括其有效期限；是否存在任何效率理由，以及是否预期将折扣转嫁给消费者。分析进一步强调了排斥可能是无成本的，或者几乎是无成本的，并且当垄断者有非价格手段强迫购买者忠诚时可以实现。此外，还探讨了中间案例，其中排除虽然并非完全没有成本，但对垄断者来说比普通掠夺性定价便宜。