This article contributes to an understanding of why autocrats have accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Leveraging their ability to obstruct their own prosecution, autocrats have traded off the risk of unwanted prosecutions against the deterrent threat that prosecutions pose to political rivals and patrons of their enemies conspiring to oust them. The risk of unwanted prosecutions and the court's deterrent threat both arise because ICC prosecutions credibly communicate guilt for international crimes to capital-disbursing democracies, which may, insofar as possible, use leader-specific economic statecraft to prevent the administration of foreign states by those whom the court signals are guilty of international crimes. Analysis using fixed effects and matching shows that a greater reliance on capital publicly financed by democracies increased the probability that a state accepted the court's jurisdiction only when it was an autocracy (1998–2017). ICC jurisdiction also lengthened the tenure of autocrats and reduced the severity of civil conflict in autocracies.

中文翻译：

---

对国际法的专制同意：以国际刑事法院的管辖权为例，1998-2017

本文有助于理解独裁者为何接受国际刑事法院的管辖权。独裁者利用他们阻碍自己起诉的能力，在不受欢迎的起诉风险与起诉对政治对手和密谋驱逐他们的敌人的赞助人构成的威慑威胁之间进行了权衡。不受欢迎的起诉风险和法院的威慑威胁都出现了，因为国际刑事法院的起诉将国际罪行的罪行可靠地传达给了资本支出的民主国家，这些国家可能会尽可能使用领导人特定的经济治国术来阻止那些不正当的人管理外国。法院信号犯有国际罪行。使用固定效应和匹配的分析表明，对民主国家公共资助资本的更大依赖增加了一个国家仅在其为独裁国家时才接受法院管辖权的可能性（1998-2017 年）。国际刑事法院的管辖权还延长了独裁者的任期，并降低了独裁国家内部冲突的严重性。