How do international observers decide whether to criticize or condone electoral fraud in a country? We argue that this decision depends on the identity of the victims of electoral fraud. A monitoring organization is more likely to overlook fraud committed against groups that are deemed dangerous by its sponsor. Based on this insight, we hypothesize that in the post-Cold War era election monitors are more tolerant of fraud against Islamic challengers, especially when Islamic movements are perceived as a threat to political stability. In support of our hypothesis, we find that outside monitors are more likely to endorse an election in countries with an Islamic opposition party and an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign. Furthermore, we find that the effect is driven by Western monitoring organizations and becomes stronger after the September 11 attacks. Our findings provide a simple yet powerful insight: the calculus of outside observers depends not only on who they wish to see in power, but also who they want to keep from power.

中文翻译：

---

危险的竞争者：选举监督员、伊斯兰反对党和恐怖主义

国际观察员如何决定是批评还是纵容一个国家的选举舞弊？我们认为，这一决定取决于选举舞弊受害者的身份。监控组织更有可能忽视对其发起人认为危险的团体实施的欺诈行为。基于这一见解，我们假设在冷战后时代的选举监督员更能容忍针对伊斯兰挑战者的欺诈行为，尤其是当伊斯兰运动被视为对政治稳定的威胁时。为了支持我们的假设，我们发现外部监督者更有可能支持在伊斯兰反对党和正在进行的伊斯兰恐怖主义活动的国家进行选举。此外，我们发现这种影响是由西方监测组织推动的，并且在 9 月 11 日的袭击事件之后变得更加强烈。我们的发现提供了一个简单而有力的见解：外部观察者的计算不仅取决于他们希望看到谁掌权，还取决于他们希望阻止谁掌权。