More than 3,000 international investment agreements (IIAs) provide foreign investors with substantive protections in host states and access to binding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In recent years, states increasingly have sought to change their treaty commitments through the practices of renegotiation and termination, so far affecting about 300 IIAs. The received wisdom is that this development reflects a “backlash” against the regime and an attempt by governments to reclaim sovereignty, consistent with broader antiglobalization trends. Using new data on the degree to which IIA provisions restrict state regulatory space (SRS), we provide the first systematic investigation into the effect of ISDS experiences on state decisions to adjust their treaties. The empirical analysis indicates that exposure to investment claims leads either to the renegotiation of IIAs in the direction of greater SRS or to their termination. This effect varies, however, with the nature of involvement in ISDS and with respect to different treaty provisions.

中文翻译：

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一朝被蛇咬十年怕井绳？投资争端、国家主权和条约设计的变化

超过 3,000 份国际投资协议 (IIA) 为外国投资者在东道国提供实质性保护，并获得具有约束力的投资者与国家争端解决 (ISDS)。近年来，各国越来越多地寻求通过重新谈判和终止的做法来改变其条约承诺，迄今为止影响了大约 300 个国际投资协定。普遍的看法是，这种事态发展反映了对该政权的“强烈反对”以及各国政府收回主权的企图，这与更广泛的反全球化趋势相一致。利用有关 IIA 条款限制州监管空间 (SRS) 程度的新数据，我们首次系统地调查了 ISDS 经验对州调整条约的决定的影响。实证分析表明，投资债权敞口要么导致国际投资协定朝着更大的 SRS 方向重新谈判，要么导致其终止。然而，这种影响因参与 ISDS 的性质和不同的条约规定而异。