In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the most popular solutions. While it is a fundamentally static concept, the consideration of a sequential extension of the underlying dominance correspondence gave rise to a selection of non-empty generalizations. Among these, the payoff-equivalence minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set are defined by a similar set of conditions. We identify some problems with the payoff-equivalence minimal dominant set and propose an appropriate reformulation called the minimal dominant set. We show that replacing asymptotic external stability by sequential weak dominance leaves the myopic stable set unaffected. The myopic stable set is therefore equivalent to the minimal dominant set.

在合作游戏中，尽管联盟结构的核心可能是空洞的，但它仍然是最受欢迎的解决方案之一。尽管这是一个基本静态的概念，但考虑到基础优势对应关系的顺序扩展，导致选择了非空泛化。其中，收益等价的最小显性集和近视稳定集由一组相似的条件定义。我们确定了与支付等价最小占优集有关的一些问题，并提出了一个适当的公式，称为最小占优集。我们表明，用连续的弱优势代替渐近的外​​部稳定性，使近视稳定集不受影响。因此，近视稳定集等于最小显性集。