Abstract

This study investigates the effectiveness of international environmental agreements (IEAs) and how it might be affected by the development of pro-environmental behaviour among households and firms. We propose a new framework based on a two-nested-game approach composed by: (1) a one-shot game with two asymmetric countries that negotiate the international abatement target, and (2) an evolutionary game which describes the economic structure resulting from agents’ interactions. These two games are nested because the initial economic structure determines the welfare of each country, and thus the outcome of Game 1 which, in turn, is embedded in Game 2, modifies the agents’ pay-off and the economic structure thereof. Numerical simulation outcomes suggest three key messages. First, we find that global solutions do not automatically produce the expected effects irrespective of any free-riding assumption. Second, extreme climate risks might not lead to a high abatement target in the event of marked cross-country inequality. Third, adverse consumers’ environmental attitudes might hamper the success of an IEA. The above observations entail that governments should not simply impose environmental laws. Rather, top-down policies and bottom-up interventions should be coordinated; otherwise, they might fail if undertaken in isolation.

Graphic abstract

中文翻译：

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一种新的两面游戏方法：将微观和宏观尺度联系到国际环境协定中

摘要

这项研究调查了国际环境协议（IEA）的有效性以及家庭和企业之间亲环境行为的发展如何影响它。我们提出了一种基于两巢式游戏方法的新框架，该方法包括：（1）具有两个非对称的单发游戏谈判国际减排目标的国家，以及（2）演化博弈，描述了代理商互动产生的经济结构。这两个博弈是嵌套的，因为初始的经济结构决定了每个国家的福利，因此博弈1的结果又嵌入博弈2中，从而改变了代理人的收益及其经济结构。数值模拟结果表明了三个关键信息。首先，我们发现，无论采取任何搭便车的假设，全局解决方案都不会自动产生预期的效果。其次，如果明显的跨国不平等，极端的气候风险可能不会导致较高的减排目标。第三，不利于消费者的环境态度可能会阻碍IEA的成功。上述观察表明，政府不应简单地制定环境法。相反，应该协调自上而下的政策和自下而上的干预措施；否则，如果孤立地进行，它们可能会失败。

图形摘要