We analyze the first model of a group contest with players that are heterogeneous in their risk preferences. In our model, individuals’ preferences are represented by a utility function exhibiting a generalized form of constant absolute risk aversion, allowing us to consider any combination of risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-loving players. We begin by proving equilibrium existence and uniqueness under both linear and convex investment costs. Then, we explore how the sorting of a compatible set of players by their risk attitudes into competing groups affects aggregate investment. With linear costs, a balanced sorting (i.e., minimizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups) always produces an aggregate investment level that is at least as high as an unbalanced sorting (i.e., maximizing the variance in risk attitudes across groups). Under convex costs, however, identifying which sorting is optimal is more nuanced and depends on preference and cost parameters.

我们分析了第一个与风险偏好不同的玩家进行团体竞赛的模型。在我们的模型中，个人偏好由效用函数表示，效用函数表现出恒定绝对风险厌恶的广义形式，允许我们考虑风险规避、风险中性和爱好风险的参与者的任何组合。我们首先证明线性和凸投资成本下的均衡存在性和唯一性。然后，我们探讨了根据风险态度将一组兼容的参与者分类到竞争组中如何影响总投资。对于线性成本，平衡排序（即最小化跨组风险态度的差异）总是产生至少与不平衡排序（即最大化跨组风险态度差异）一样高的总投资水平。