In this paper, I raise the following problem: what propositions have an import in Avicenna's modal logic? Which ones do not? Starting from the assumption that the singular and quantified propositions have an import if they require the existence of their subject's referent(s) to be true, I first discuss the import of the absolute propositions then I analyze the import of the modal propositions by considering Avicenna's definitions and the relations between these propositions. This leads to the following results: Avicenna's general opinion is that the affirmatives, be they assertoric or modal, have an import while the negatives do not. The possible affirmative propositions are given an import both in the externalist and the internalist post-Avicennan readings, provided that the subject is not impossible. However, the theory is not always clear, for the propositions containing ‘sometimes not’ are given an import, together with the negative necessaries containing ‘as long as it is P’, despite their negative character; the necessary affirmative propositions containing ‘as long as it is P’ are given an import, although they do not require it. In addition, Avicenna's analysis of the special assertorics E and O (containing the internal conditions ‘at some times but not always’) and their contradictories is erroneous, which does not help determine their import. But when correctly analyzed, these special E and O do not have an import, while their contradictories – I and A special assertorics respectively – have an import.

中文翻译：

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AVICENNA 模式逻辑中的存在性导入

在本文中，我提出以下问题：在阿维森纳的模态逻辑中哪些命题具有重要意义？哪些没有？从单数命题和量化命题如果要求其主语所指对象的存在为真则具有重要意义的假设出发，我首先讨论绝对命题的重要意义，然后通过考虑 Avicenna 的模态命题的重要意义来分析模态命题的重要意义。定义和这些命题之间的关系。这导致了以下结果：阿维森纳的一般意见是，肯定句，无论是断言式的还是情态的，都具有重要意义，而否定句则没有。可能的肯定命题在外在论者和内在论者的后阿维森南解读中都被赋予了重要性，前提是该主题不是不可能的。然而，这个理论并不总是很清楚，因为包含“有时不是”的命题，以及包含“只要它是 P”的否定必要条件，尽管它们具有否定性质；包含“只要它是 P”的必要肯定命题被赋予一个导入，尽管它们不需要它。此外，阿维森纳对特殊断言的分析乙和○（包含内部的条件“有时但并非总是”），它们的矛盾是错误的，这无助于确定它们的重要性。但如果分析得当，这些特殊的乙和○没有进口，而他们的矛盾——一世和一种分别有特殊的断言——有一个导入。