In this paper, I propose to expose the logical structure al-Bāqillānī's argument for the existence of God and argue that it presents a distinctive type of argument that cannot be classified under the classical types of ontological, cosmological, and design arguments. The peculiarity of al-Bāqillānī's argument is related to the concept of God it presupposes. Developing Herbert Davidson's insights regarding this argument and criticizing Majid Fakhry's interpretation of it, I aim to clarify this concept of God by the concept of agency. In a nutshell, I argue that al-Bāqillānī presents a distinctive type of argument for the existence of God, which I propose calling the “cosmological argument from agency.” I consider it cosmological because it is an inference from the universe to the existence of God. Nonetheless, it is different from the classical versions of the cosmological argument for that the concept of agency and the idea of a personal deity play a central role in this argument.

中文翻译：

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AL-BĀQILLĀNĪ 来自机构的宇宙论论证

在本文中，我建议揭露 al-Bāqillānī 论证上帝存在的逻辑结构，并认为它提出了一种独特的论证类型，不能归类为本体论、宇宙论和设计论证的经典类型。al-Bāqillānī 论证的特殊性与其预设的上帝概念有关。发展赫伯特戴维森对这一论点的见解并批评马吉德法赫里对它的解释，我旨在通过代理的概念来澄清这个上帝的概念。简而言之，我认为 al-Bāqillānī 为上帝的存在提出了一种独特的论证类型，我建议将其称为“来自代理的宇宙论论证”。我认为它是宇宙论的，因为它是从宇宙推论到上帝的存在。尽管如此，