We examine decision-making, shared authority, and pluralism as key characteristics for the effective co-management of natural resources. Drawing on the concept of network governance, we complement this approach by studying localized practices of governance that support existing and compensate for missing aspects in the regulation. The regime of territorial use rights for fisheries (TURF) in Chile is a recognized example of large-scale co-management that has given rise to local organizations that manage and exploit benthic resources. Based on multi-sited qualitative fieldwork across five regions, we analyze practices with respect to two governance objects: the deterrence of illegal fishing and the periodic assessment of the fisheries’ biology fields. Our analysis shows that local fisher organizations have institutionalized informal practices of surveillance and monitoring to fill in the gaps of existing regulations. Although fisher organizations and consultants—the so-called management and exploitation areas for benthic resources (AMERB)—have managed to operate the TURF regime, they depend on the government to enforce regulations and receive public subsidies to cover the costs of delegated governance tasks. We suggest that governance effectiveness could benefit from delegating additional authority to the local level. This would enhance the supervision of productive areas and better adaptation of national co-management regulations to the specific geographical context.

中文翻译：

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网络治理视角下的智利小规模渔业共同管理

我们将决策，共享权限和多元化视为有效地自然资源共同管理的关键特征。利用网络治理的概念，我们通过研究支持治理的现有治理并弥补法规中缺失方面的本地化治理实践来补充这种方法。智利的渔业领土使用权制度是公认的大规模共同管理的例子，这种共同管理已经引起了管理和开发底栖资源的地方组织。基于五个地区的多点定性田野调查，我们针对两个治理对象分析了实践：非法捕捞的威慑力和对渔业生物领域的定期评估。我们的分析表明，当地渔民组织已将非正式的监视和监视做法制度化，以填补现有法规的空白。尽管渔民组织和顾问（即所谓的底栖资源管理和开发区）已经成功地执行了TURF制度，但他们依靠政府来执行法规并获得公共补贴来支付委派的治理任务的费用。我们建议，将额外的权力下放到地方层面可以使治理有效性受益。这将加强对生产区的监督，并使国家共同管理条例更好地适应特定的地理环境。尽管渔民组织和顾问（即所谓的底栖资源管理和开发区）已经成功地执行了TURF制度，但他们依靠政府来执行法规并获得公共补贴来支付委派的治理任务的费用。我们建议，将额外的权力下放到地方一级可以使治理有效性受益。这将加强对生产区的监督，并使国家共同管理条例更好地适应特定的地理环境。尽管渔民组织和顾问（即所谓的底栖资源管理和开发区）已经成功地执行了TURF制度，但他们依靠政府来执行法规并获得公共补贴来支付委派的治理任务的费用。我们建议，将额外的权力下放到地方层面可以使治理有效性受益。这将加强对生产区的监督，并使国家共同管理条例更好地适应特定的地理环境。我们建议，将额外的权力下放到地方层面可以使治理有效性受益。这将加强对生产区的监督，并使国家共同管理条例更好地适应特定的地理环境。我们建议，将额外的权力下放到地方层面可以使治理有效性受益。这将加强对生产区的监督，并使国家共同管理条例更好地适应特定的地理环境。