Zambian land is governed under hybrid system that includes statutory and customary tenure, and the administration of the sector has long been regarded as inadequate by a host of international and domestic stakeholders, both neoliberals and pro-poor advocates alike. Consequently, major land reform has been on the agenda for 2 decades, particularly during the rule of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) from 1991–2011, yet scant progress was made. The status quo appeared untenable, inasmuch as it left all sides unsatisfied: It was inconsistent with the country's generally neoliberal, investor-friendly focus; it denied rural smallholders' access to collateral through title, and it simultaneously left rural voters potentially at the mercy of unscrupulous chiefs and savvy domestic and international land investors and speculators. The government largely failed to advance land reform despite years of rhetoric to the contrary. This paper identifies 3 principal reasons for this inertia: first, the system prevented opportunities for rent extraction by unscrupulous chiefs and their counterparts in the local and national land bodies and their international beneficiaries. Second, demand for land reform among the rural poor was diffuse and weakly articulated, meaning advocacy scanty. And third, although perhaps not as incendiary as countries such as Zimbabwe or Kenya, land reform was and remains politically sensitive. As Zambian politics grew increasingly competitive, the MMD could not afford to alienate any constituency. Siding with “investors” would needlessly alienate chiefs and the main users of customary lands, the rural poor, whereas the reverse would jeopardize investment imperatives, particularly in the land-hungry mining, agriculture, and tourism sectors. Thus, Zambia under the MMD can be seen as caught between a model of “traditional,” customary tenure, and a “modern” property rights regime: Various proposals for reforms could not mutually satisfy address poverty alleviation needs and market demand for land. The best solution politically, therefore, was inertia. Yet the result of policy inertia over time is de facto land “reform” by other means, namely, the gradual alienation of the poor from lands to which they previously enjoyed access, in favor of the investor class.

中文翻译：

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惯性自由化：1991-2011年赞比亚多党民主运动下的土地改革政治

赞比亚的土地由包括法定和习惯使用权在内的混合制度管理，长期以来，许多国际和国内利益相关者，包括新自由主义者和扶贫倡导者，都认为该部门的管理不足。因此，重大的土地改革已提上议程20年，特别是在1991年至2011年的多党民主运动（MMD）统治时期，但进展甚微。这种现状似乎无法维持，因为它使各方都感到不满意：这与该国通常对新自由主义，投资者友好的关注相矛盾；它剥夺了农村小农通过所有权获得抵押品的权利，同时还让农村选民受到了不道德的酋长以及精明的国内外土地投资者和投机者的摆布。尽管有许多相反的言论，但政府在很大程度上未能推进土地改革。本文指出了造成这种惰性的3个主要原因：首先，该制度阻止了不道德的酋长及其在地方和国家土地机构及其国际受益者中的对应者获取租金的机会。其次，农村贫困人口对土地改革的需求是分散的，表达不力，这意味着倡导工作很少。第三，尽管也许不像津巴布韦或肯尼亚这样的国家那样凶猛，但土地改革仍然并且在政治上仍然敏感。随着赞比亚政治竞争的日趋激烈，MMD负担不起疏远任何选区的负担。与“投资人”站在一边会不必要地疏远酋长和习惯土地的主要使用者，农村贫困人口，相反，相反的情况将危及投资的必要性，尤其是在饥渴的采矿，农业和旅游业中。因此，赞比亚在MMD下可以被视为介于“传统”，“惯常使用权”模式和“现代”产权制度之间：各种改革建议不能相互满足解决贫困和土地需求的需求。因此，政治上最好的解决方案是惯性。然而，随着时间的流逝，政策惯性的结果实际上是通过其他手段对土地进行“改革”，即穷人逐渐从他们先前享有的土地中疏远，从而有利于投资者阶层。以及“现代”产权制度：各种改革建议不能相互满足解决贫困的需求和土地的市场需求。因此，政治上最好的解决方案是惯性。然而，随着时间的流逝，政策惯性的结果实际上是通过其他手段对土地进行“改革”，即穷人逐渐从他们先前享有的土地中疏远，从而有利于投资者阶层。以及“现代”产权制度：各种改革建议不能相互满足解决贫困的需求和土地的市场需求。因此，政治上最好的解决方案是惯性。然而，随着时间的流逝，政策惯性的结果实际上是通过其他手段对土地进行“改革”，即穷人逐渐从他们先前享有的土地中疏远，从而有利于投资者阶层。