Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market's liquidity during panics, but the rise in outside lending by trust companies and interior banks in the decade leading up the panic weakened the influence of the large banks. Creating a reliable source of liquidity and reserves external to the financial market like a central bank became obvious after the panic. In the call loan market, like the REPO market in 2008, lack of information on the identity of lenders and volume of the market hindered attempts to stop panic-related depositor withdrawals. Our new estimates of who was participating in the call loan market reveal that it did not contract after 1907; while the trust companies became less important, the New York national banks and outside lenders more than made up the difference.

中文翻译：

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纽约市电话贷款市场的外部贷款：来自 1907 年恐慌的证据

在 1907 年恐慌之前，纽约市的大型银行能够在恐慌期间维持通知贷款市场的流动性，但在引发恐慌的十年中，信托公司和内部银行的外部贷款增加削弱了大型银行的影响力。在恐慌之后，像中央银行一样在金融市场外部创造可靠的流动性和储备来源变得显而易见。在通知贷款市场，就像 2008 年的 REPO 市场一样，缺乏关于贷方身份和市场数量的信息阻碍了阻止与恐慌相关的存款人取款的尝试。我们对谁参与了活期贷款市场的新估计显示，它在 1907 年之后没有收缩；虽然信托公司变得不那么重要了，但纽约的国家银行和外部贷方弥补了差额。