The criminal justice system of England and Wales increasingly deploys the polygraph to extract information from released offenders. Although there is little judicial authority regarding the admissibility of polygraph evidence, we should not misinterpret silence as legal uncertainty. The paper will, first, show that the central claim for the understanding of the polygraph—i.e. the presupposition that the polygraph indicates deception—is inextricably linked to an obsolete paradigm in psychology (Introspection). Secondly, I will turn to first principles in the law of evidence, especially the general ban on opinion evidence and the requirement for scientific validity. The requirement that expert evidence has a sufficiently reliable scientific basis explains why polygraph evidence cannot be adduced at the criminal process. Thirdly, I will draw attention to the use of polygraph tests in the context of probation, pursuant to the Offender Management Act 2007. With the use of the polygraph, the criminal justice system does not only infringe the released offender’s human rights, but also fails to protect the public. The combination of inadmissibility of the polygraph in the criminal process and its use from probation services creates thus a major contradiction which is detrimental to the integrity of the legal order.

英格兰和威尔士的刑事司法系统越来越多地使用测谎仪，以从释放的罪犯那里提取信息。尽管关于测谎仪证据的可采性的司法权威很少，但我们不应将沉默视为法律不确定性。本文首先将表明，理解测谎仪的核心主张（即测谎仪表明欺骗的前提）与心理学的过时范式密不可分（自省）。其次，我将谈谈证据法的首要原则，尤其是对证据证据的一般性禁止和对科学有效性的要求。专家证据必须具有足够可靠的科学依据的要求解释了为什么在犯罪过程中不能援引测谎仪证据。第三，根据2007年《罪犯管理法》，我将提请注意在缓刑中使用测谎仪测试。使用测谎仪，刑事司法系统不仅侵犯了释放的罪犯的人权，而且还失败了保护公众。测谎仪在刑事诉讼中的不可接受性及其在缓刑服务中的使用，共同构成了一个主要矛盾，这不利于法律秩序的完整性。