‘The Security Problems of the Democratic Republic of Congo continue to puzzle international peace and policy makers’.1 This is how, in 2009, Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers set out to explain conflict dynamics in the Kivu in this journal. They argued that while the peace process successfully unified the Congo and produced new, democratic institutions, it also led to the privatization of governance and the entrenching of conflicts. Within the new state structures, factionalized elites quickly began to exploit and feed insecurity as a means to leverage economic and political gain, often reproducing local struggles over power and historical grievances over land, identity, and economic marginalization.2 Misdiagnosing the Congolese state as failed, instead of deeply functional for a narrow elite, donors became complicit in the violence as these new elites drew on outside resources.3 Eight years on, much of Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers’ analysis remains highly relevant even as underlying dynamics have evolved. Since President Joseph Kabila’s contested re-election in 2011, the country has witnessed a steady deterioration of human security, most notably in the Kivus but also during the recent crisis in Kasai.4 Displacement has continued apace, reaching around 4.5 million—one of the highest levels ever recorded since the onset of the conflicts in 1993, with almost a million newly displaced in the first half of 2017 alone.5 At the same time, turmoil has engulfed national politics, as Kabila refused to step down at the end of his second constitutional term in 2016, delaying elections until the end of 2018, if not further. During this past decade, four developments have altered the contours of the conflict, contributing to a perpetuation of violence and insecurity. First, Congolese political and military elites have become increasingly invested in conflict, rendering it an end in itself. Instead of promoting cohesion and discipline, the government has perceived its security apparatus primarily as a means for distributing patronage, only occasionally prioritizing stability. Second, with the end of the Congres national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP) rebellion in 2009, and more dramatically since the defeat of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) in 2013, regional involvement has decreased and the Kivus have seen few foreign-backed rebellions. This, combined with the national political crisis, has led armed groups to switch the focus of their bellicose rhetoric away from Rwanda towards Kinshasa. Third, there has been a dramatic proliferation of belligerents from a few dozens to over a hundred, while at the same time armed groups have coalesced into often unstable coalitions. Fourth, and most recently, insecurity is becoming increasingly politicized as political turmoil reverberates in the Kivus, prompting elites to bolster their influence through armed mobilization. Before analyzing these four trends in more detail, it is useful to provide an overview of key events in the past decade.

中文翻译：

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重新审视基伍难以解决的安全难题

“刚果民主共和国的安全问题继续困扰着国际和平与政策制定者”。1 这就是 2009 年 Koen Vlassenroot 和 Timothy Raeymaekers 在本期刊中着手解释基伍冲突动态的方式。他们争辩说，虽然和平进程成功地统一了刚果并产生了新的民主制度，但也导致了治理私有化和冲突的根深蒂固。在新的国家结构中，派系精英迅速开始利用和助长不安全感，以此作为利用经济和政治利益的手段，经常再现地方争夺权力的斗争以及对土地、身份和经济边缘化的历史不满。 2 误诊刚果国家为失败，而不是为狭隘的精英提供深刻的功能，随着这些新精英利用外部资源，捐助者成为暴力的同谋。3 八年过去了，即使潜在的动态发生了变化，Vlassenroot 和 Raeymaekers 的大部分分析仍然高度相关。自从约瑟夫·卡比拉总统于 2011 年竞选连任以来，该国的人类安全持续恶化，尤其是在南北基伍以及最近的开赛危机期间。4 流离失所继续快速发展，达到约 450 万人——其中之一这是自 1993 年冲突爆发以来的最高记录，仅 2017 年上半年就有近 100 万人新流离失所。 5 与此同时，由于卡比拉在其任期结束时拒绝下台，动乱席卷了国家政治。 2016 年的第二个宪法任期，将选举推迟到 2018 年底，如果不是更进一步的话。在这过去的十年里，四个事态发展改变了冲突的轮廓，助长了暴力和不安全的长期存在。首先，刚果政治和军事精英越来越多地投入冲突，使其本身成为目的。政府没有促进凝聚力和纪律，而是将其安全机构主要视为分配赞助的手段，只是偶尔将稳定放在首位。其次，随着 2009 年全国保卫人民大会 (CNDP) 叛乱的结束，以及自 2013 年“23 运动”(M23) 失败以来的戏剧性变化，区域参与减少，南北基伍几乎没有看到外国——支持的叛乱。这与国家政治危机相结合，导致武装团体将其好战言论的重点从卢旺达转移到金沙萨。第三，交战者从几十人急剧增加到一百多人，与此同时，武装团体联合成往往不稳定的联盟。第四，也是最近，随着政治动荡在南北基伍的回荡，不安全越来越政治化，促使精英通过武装动员来增强他们的影响力。在更详细地分析这四个趋势之前，有必要概述过去十年的主要事件。促使精英通过武装动员来增强他们的影响力。在更详细地分析这四个趋势之前，有必要概述过去十年的主要事件。促使精英通过武装动员来增强他们的影响力。在更详细地分析这四个趋势之前，有必要概述过去十年的主要事件。