The literature studying the behavioral effects of political corruption is rapidly growing. While some studies explore the contextual and institutional factors that can neutralize the effects of corruption, this article addresses a different mechanism for weak electoral accountability for corruption: citizen (de)mobilization. It uses a vignette experiment embedded in a nationally representative AmericasBarometer survey in Colombia to isolate the causal effect of political corruption on electoral participation. The results suggest that receiving credible information about the corrupt behavior of politicians running for office decreases the likelihood of participation in elections. It also shows that corruption demobilizes voters even when corrupt politicians are able to provide public works to their constituencies, which casts doubt on the idea that citizens exchange integrity for favorable policy outcomes.

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腐败的政客是动员还是动员选民？哥伦比亚的小插图实验

研究政治腐败行为影响的文献正在迅速增长。虽然一些研究探讨了可以抵消腐败影响的背景和制度因素，但本文讨论了一种不同的机制，用于削弱选举对腐败的问责制：公民（去）动员。它使用嵌入在哥伦比亚具有全国代表性的 AmericasBarometer 调查中的小插曲实验来分离政治腐败对选举参与的因果影响。结果表明，获得有关竞选公职的政客腐败行为的可靠信息会降低参与选举的可能性。它还表明，即使腐败的政客能够为其选区提供公共工程，腐败也会使选民失去活力，