What explains the remarkable resilience of pension regulation in postauthoritarian Chile, even after decades of majoritarian voter discontent and growing international and domestic criticism of Pinochet’s pioneering private capitalization system? This puzzling outcome can be understood only by looking at the combined effect of the pension industry’s long-term power-building investments and its short-term political actions to outmaneuver state and societal challengers. Engaging new theoretical developments in political economy and historical institutionalism, this study examines the long-term process by which the previously nonexistent Chilean pension industry expanded and leveraged its power during key episodes of open contestation. The analysis of pension regulation in Chile between the 1980s and the 2010s illustrates the importance of placing business power in time, motivating new rounds of theory building in the quest to address the perennial question of how business gets what it wants in the political arena.

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如何建立和运用商业力量：智利养老金监管的政治经济学，1990-2018

什么解释了后威权主义智利养老金监管的显着弹性，即使在几十年来多数选民的不满以及对皮诺切特开创性的私人资本化制度的国际和国内批评越来越多之后？这种令人费解的结果只有通过观察养老金行业的长期电力建设投资及其短期政治行动以战胜国家和社会挑战者的综合影响才能理解。本研究结合政治经济学和历史制度主义的新理论发展，考察了以前不存在的智利养老金行业在公开竞争的关键时期扩大和利用其权力的长期过程。