What makes the “norm” a distinct concept? How do norms differ from other aspects of the moral and social fabric of society? In this article I argue that imposing stricter boundaries on the norm concept could have significant analytical payoffs, especially in the human rights literature. Greater conceptual clarity on the boundaries of the norm concept highlights three important distinctions: the difference between norms and moral principles, norms and supererogatory standards, and norms and formal law. Clarifying what a norm is (and, importantly, what it is not) improves our analytic equipment and theories, but the inquiry is not purely a theoretical exercise. Clarifying the norm concept enables us to ask new questions about, and rethink old findings on issues like the role of shaming in human rights advocacy, the origins of norms and challenges to their construction, what constitutes evidence of the existence of a norm, and whether, in fact, all human rights have been translated into norms.

中文翻译：

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什么不是规范？重新定义人权文献中“规范”的概念界限

是什么让“规范”成为一个独特的概念？规范与社会道德和社会结构的其他方面有何不同？在本文中，我认为对规范概念施加更严格的界限可能会产生重大的分析收益，尤其是在人权文献中。规范概念边界的更清晰的概念突出了三个重要区别：规范与道德原则、规范与上位标准之间的区别，以及规范与正式法律之间的区别。阐明规范是什么（以及重要的是，规范不是什么）可以改进我们的分析设备和理论，但探究并不是纯粹的理论练习。澄清规范概念使我们能够提出新问题并重新思考关于羞辱在人权倡导中的作用等问题的旧发现，