Sectoral interests play an important role in distributive politics, but their influence is difficult to measure. We compare the effect of international oil prices on subsidies for domestic gasoline and diesel consumption. Because diesel is used by a smaller number of organized agricultural and transportation interests, they are more capable of collective action than the dispersed beneficiaries of gasoline subsidies. The conventional wisdom holds that sectoral interests could mobilize to stop reform (e.g., price increases, deregulation). Challenging this view, we consider the possibility that sectoral interests promote reform by facilitating the targeted allocation of compensation and exemptions. An empirical analysis of gasoline and diesel prices, 1991-2012, strongly supports the second hypothesis: diesel prices respond to international oil prices more strongly than do gasoline prices. Quantitative tests and case studies allow us to explore causal mechanisms, verify that the gasoline-diesel difference is related to actual policy reforms, and reject alternative explanations.

中文翻译：

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部门利益如何塑造分配政治？来自汽油和柴油补贴改革的证据

部门利益在分配政治中发挥着重要作用，但其影响难以衡量。我们比较了国际油价对国内汽油和柴油消费补贴的影响。由于柴油被少数有组织的农业和运输利益集团使用，他们比汽油补贴的分散受益者更有能力采取集体行动。传统观点认为，部门利益可以动员起来阻止改革（例如，价格上涨、放松管制）。针对这一观点，我们考虑了部门利益通过促进补偿和豁免的定向分配来促进改革的可能性。1991-2012 年汽油和柴油价格的实证分析强烈支持第二个假设：柴油价格对国际油价的反应比汽油价格更强烈。定量测试和案例研究使我们能够探索因果机制，验证汽柴油差异与当前的政策改革有关，并拒绝其他解释。