We document significant heterogeneity in the relation between CEO equity incentives and firm value using quantile regression. We show that CEO delta is more effective in the presence of ample investment opportunities, while CEO vega is more beneficial for firms lacking investment opportunities. Further, Tobin’s Q increases in CEO delta for more risk tolerant firms but increases in CEO vega for more risk averse firms. We also observe that higher monitoring intensity after SOX reduces CEO delta’s role in compensation. Risk aversion alters the optimal incentive-value relation and the nature of this relation also depends on the level of Tobin’s Q. JEL classification: G30; G34; J33; M52

中文翻译：

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管理者股权激励对企业价值影响的异质性

我们使用分位数回归记录了CEO股权激励与公司价值之间关系的显着异质性。我们表明，在存在大量投资机会的情况下，CEO Delta更为有效，而CEO vega对于缺乏投资机会的公司则更为有利。此外，对于更多的风险承受能力的公司，托宾Q的CEO增量增加，而对于更多风险厌恶的公司，CEO的vega的增加。我们还观察到，SOX之后更高的监控强度降低了CEO三角洲在薪酬中的作用。风险规避改变了最优激励价值关系，这种关系的性质也取决于托宾Q的水平。G34；J33；M52