Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of private investor's fair preference on the governmental compensation mechanism based on the uncertainty of income for the public-private-partnership (PPP) project. Design/methodology/approach Based on the governmental dilemma for the compensation of PPP project, a generalized compensation contract is designed by the combination of compensation before the event and compensation after the event. Then the private investor's claimed concession profit is taken as its fair reference point according to the idea of the BO model, and its fair utility function is established by improving the FS model. Thus the master-slave counter measure game is applied to conduct the behavior modeling for the governmental compensation contract design. Findings By analyzing the model given in this paper, some conclusions are obtained. First, the governmental optimal compensation contract is fair incentive for the private investor. Second, the private fair preference is not intuitively positive or negative related to the social efficiency of compensation. Only under some given conditions, the correlation will show the consistent effect. Third, the private fair behavior’s impact on the efficiency of compensation will become lower and lower as the social cost of compensation reduces. Fourth, the governmental effective compensation scheme should be carried out based on the different comparison scene of the private claimed portfolio profit and the expected revenue for the project. Originality/value This study analyzes the effects of private investor's fair preference on the validity of governmental generalized compensation contract of the PPP project for the first time; and the governmental generalized compensation contract designed in this study is a pioneering and exploratory attempt.

中文翻译：

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PPP项目的一般性补偿合同的有效性，并根据特许权收益考虑私有公允

目的本文的目的是基于公私伙伴关系（PPP）项目收入的不确定性，分析私人投资者的公平偏好对政府补偿机制的影响。设计/方法/方法基于政府对PPP项目补偿的困境，通过事前补偿与事后补偿相结合的方式设计出广义补偿合同。然后，根据BO模型的思想，将私人投资者要求的特许权收益作为其公平参考点，并通过改进FS模型来建立其公平效用函数。因此，运用主从对策博弈对政府补偿合同设计进行行为建模。结果通过分析本文给出的模型，得到一些结论。首先，政府最优补偿合同是对私人投资者的公平激励。其次，私人公平偏好与补偿的社会效率在直觉上不是正面的还是负面的。仅在某些给定条件下，相关性才会显示出一致的效果。第三，随着补偿的社会成本降低，私人公平行为对补偿效率的影响将越来越小。第四，政府有效补偿方案应根据私人要求的投资组合利润与项目预期收益的不同比较场景来实施。创意/价值这项研究分析了私人投资者的影响。首次对PPP项目的政府广义补偿合同的有效性给予公平的偏爱；本研究设计的政府广义补偿合同是一种开拓性的探索性尝试。