I model a teacher transfer program in South Korea as a matching-with-contracts problem. The current (non-centralized) system allows a teacher wishing to make an inter-state transfer to submit, at most, one application and will approve only a one-to-one exchange. Consequently, not only is this current system unstable and inefficient, but it also does not adequately reflect the teachers’ preferences. In contrast, the centralized mechanism I propose fully represents teachers’ preferences and is less wasteful. One key requirement of a teacher transfer program is that it must protect the rights of currently existing teachers who wish to transfer from their current positions, perhaps to satisfy familial needs, for only a short period of time. However, as I demonstrate, no stable mechanism exists that guarantee protection for the rights of such teachers to the positions they currently occupy. To solve this problem, I introduce a novel concept called a claim contract. A claim contract, in a matching-with-contracts model, protects current teachers by removing contracts that do not match the specified duration set by these teachers from the set of potential matches. In this paper, I propose a new mechanism, based on a claim contract, that is strategy-proof and approximates stable matching.

我将韩国的教师转移计划建模为“合同匹配”问题。当前的（非集中式）系统允许希望进行州际转移的教师最多提交一份申请，并且仅批准一对一交换。因此，当前的制度不仅不稳定，效率低下，而且还不能充分反映教师的偏好。相比之下，我提出的集中化机制充分体现了教师的喜好，浪费少。教师调动计划的一项关键要求是，该计划必须在短时间内保护希望从现有职位调职（也许以满足家庭需要）的现有教师的权利。但是，正如我所展示的，没有稳定的机制可以确保对此类教师目前所担任职务的权利进行保护。为了解决这个问题，我介绍了一个新颖的概念，称为索赔合同。在按合同匹配模型中，索偿合同通过从潜在匹配项中删除与这些教师设置的指定期限不匹配的合同来保护当前教师。在本文中，我提出了一种基于索赔合同的新机制，该机制可证明策略并近似稳定匹配。