In this paper, we build a simple model to investigate the impacts of using aviation tax to subsidize high-speed rail (HSR). We find that when the HSR subsidy is not directly linked to the aviation tax, introducing this subsidy will decrease the air traffic and increase the rail traffic on the route where air transport and HSR compete. However, if part of the aviation tax revenue is earmarked for the HSR subsidy (i.e., the integrated tax-subsidy policy), the traffic implications of the HSR subsidy will be the opposite. To extend the analysis to a transportation network, when the integrated tax-subsidy policy only involves aviation tax revenue from routes with HSR presence, it will decrease air traffic on routes without HSR. When the integrated tax-subsidy scheme involves tax revenue from the whole network, the traffic implications depend on the comparison between aviation tax rate on routes with and without HSR.

在本文中，我们建立了一个简单的模型来研究使用航空税补贴高铁（HSR）的影响。我们发现，当高铁补贴与航空税没有直接联系时，引入这种补贴将减少航空运输量，并增加航空运输与高铁竞争的路线上的铁路运输量。但是，如果将航空税收的一部分专门用于高铁补贴（即综合税收补贴政策），那么高铁补贴对交通的影响将是相反的。为了将分析扩展到交通运输网络，当综合税收补贴政策仅涉及存在高铁的航线的航空税收时，它将减少没有高铁的航线的航空运输量。当综合税收补贴计划涉及整个网络的税收时，