Purpose This paper aims to investigate the implications of governance quality on a firm’s information environment in the context of voluntary changes in hedging disclosures made by oil and gas companies. Design/methodology/approach The research utilizes a Factiva-guided search to hand-collect public disclosures related to changes in hedging policies along with the hand collection of financial derivatives positions and operational hedging contracts data using 10-K filings. The paper addresses self-selection bias, which typically plagues voluntary disclosure studies, by implementing a Heckman (1979) two-step model to estimate the decision process, make changes in their hedge program and, conditional on making changes to their hedging activities, provide disclosure. Findings Oil and gas firms with relatively poor governance are more likely to voluntarily disclose hedging changes and do so more frequently (substitution hypothesis). There is evidence that poorly governed firms in the presence of large shareholders (i.e. high institutional ownership) are more likely to provide transparency of hedging policy changes. Originality/value This is the first study to combine hand-collected changes in hedging voluntary disclosures and hand-collected derivative position data to investigate the interaction of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. The sample allows for analysis between three sub-samples: companies that do not make changes in hedging and do not hedge, firms that make changes in their hedging policies but do not disclose the changes during a given year and companies that change their hedging activities and provide voluntary disclosure. This unique setting helps to alleviate concerns of self-selection bias associated with voluntary disclosure.

中文翻译：

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自愿对冲披露和公司治理

目的本文旨在研究在油气公司对冲披露的自愿变更的情况下，治理质量对公司信息环境的影响。设计/方法/方法该研究利用Factiva引导的搜索来手工收集与对冲政策变更有关的公开信息，以及使用10-K档案手工收集金融衍生工具头寸和可操作的对冲合同数据。本文通过实施Heckman（1979）两步模型来估计决策过程，更改其对冲程序，并以对冲活动进行更改为条件，解决了通常会困扰自愿披露研究的自我选择偏见。披露。调查结果治理相对较差的石油和天然气公司更有可能自愿披露对冲变更，并且更频繁地披露（对冲假设）。有证据表明，在存在大股东的情况下，治理不善的公司（即具有较高的机构所有权）更有可能提供对冲政策变化的透明度。独创性/价值这是第一项结合对冲自愿披露对冲中的手工收集的变化和手工收集的衍生品头寸数据来研究公司治理与自愿披露的相互作用的研究。该样本允许在三个子样本之间进行分析：不进行套期保值变更且不进行套期保值的公司，更改对冲政策但未在给定年度内披露更改的公司，以及更改对冲活动并提供自愿披露的公司。这种独特的设置有助于减轻与自愿披露相关的自我选择偏见的担忧。