We build a dynamic model with endogenous middle class development, human capital accumulation, and policy choices, in order to analyze the interactions between the optimal policies implemented by the ruling elite and the key drivers of economic growth in the presence of elite rivalry. We consider that: (1) the specific policy choices depend on economic and political incentives of the elite; (2) the individuals’ decisions regarding their children’s education are endogenously determined by specific economic and political factors. Our results suggest that, contrarily to the economically motivated policies, the politically motivated policy choices imply inefficient economic outcomes and limit the development of the middle class and human capital accumulation. The results also show that higher middle class and human capital accumulation growth rates can lower the degree of elite rivalry by reducing the level of the optimal tax rate, increase public investments in education, and yield positive changes in all economic outcomes.

中文翻译：

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精英竞争下的最优政策，中产阶级发展与人力资本积累

我们建立具有内生中产阶级发展，人力资本积累和政策选择的动态模型，以分析执政精英实施的最优政策与存在精英竞争时经济增长的关键驱动因素之间的相互作用。我们认为：（1）具体的政策选择取决于精英的经济和政治动机；（2）个人关于子女教育的决定是由特定的经济和政治因素内生决定的。我们的结果表明，与出于经济动机的政策相反，出于政治动机的政策选择暗示了低效的经济成果，并限制了中产阶级的发展和人力资本积累。