I examine the effects of board member departures on CEO compensation using a sample of high-growth IPO firms. Agency theory predicts that a reduction in board monitoring by harvester directors (VCs and private equity investors) will result in an increase in CEO pay. I find that departures of the last harvester director on a board result in an immediate and lasting increase in CEO equity compensation, while prior departures by other harvester directors are not significant. The results hold even when controlling for other governance mechanisms, such as CEO wealth, CEO turnover, board composition, and external blockholder ownership.

中文翻译：

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Harvester 董事离职后的 CEO 薪酬

我使用高增长 IPO 公司的样本研究了董事会成员离职对 CEO 薪酬的影响。代理理论预测，收割机董事（风险投资人和私募股权投资者）减少对董事会的监督将导致 CEO 薪酬增加。我发现董事会最后一位收割机董事的离职会导致 CEO 股权薪酬立即且持久地增加，而其他收割机董事之前的离职并不显着。即使控制了其他治理机制，例如 CEO 财富、CEO 离职率、董事会组成和外部大股东所有权，结果仍然成立。