In an environment in which sellers can reduce the probability of defective delivery through cooperative investment, and in which enforcement of default remedies for breach of contract is imperfect, an optimal performance standard grants buyers the option to reject goods for some but not all defects, in other words, when the delivery is sufficiently defective and the seller said to be in "material breach" of contract. This optimal performance standard implements efficient cooperative investment more often under a policy that, in addition, allows buyers to collect compensation for non-delivery of the good (upon rightful rejection) than a policy that limits buyers' compensation to the recovery of the price. While contracts with liquidated damages (i.e., a customized compensation function) can solve the investment problem as long as court enforcement is not too imperfect (in which case optimal liquidated damages are excessive and likely not enforced), the doctrine of material breach with an option to reject performs well as a default rule.

中文翻译：

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有效的重大合同违约

在这样的环境中，卖方可以通过合作投资来减少有缺陷的交货的可能性，并且对于违反合同的违约补救措施的执行不完善，最佳绩效标准使买方可以选择拒绝某些但不是全部缺陷的货物。换句话说，当交货有足够的缺陷并且卖方称其“严重违反”合同时。此最佳绩效标准更频繁地实施有效的合作投资，其依据是一项政策，即允许购买者收取货物未交付（在合法拒绝时）的赔偿，而不是将购买者的赔偿限于价格恢复的政策。在合同中约定违约金的情况下（即，