How do States ‘legitimize’ their non-ratification of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees? This article examines the case of Lebanon, a country frequently hailed by the international community for its generosity towards refugees, and currently hosting the highest number of refugees in the world in proportion to its population size. While Lebanon engaged actively in the establishment of the international refugee regime, it has long insisted that it is not a country of asylum and steadfastly rejects ratification of the major refugee law instruments. Based on 10 months of field research, this article makes four arguments as to why Lebanon continues to resist ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol. First, it argues that there is a widespread and real, or simply politically expedient, uncertainty as to the obligations that come with the Convention. This includes a belief that the Convention requires that Lebanon allow for the permanent settlement of refugees on its territory. Secondly, it argues that the responsibility-shift for refugees to third parties such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees brings about obvious advantages for Lebanon, and has made it less inclined to become a party to the Convention. Thirdly, it argues that the ‘good-neighbourliness’ principle between Arab countries holds that Lebanon should not employ the term ‘refugee’ because doing so would put the State into positions that could violate the good neighbour principle; essentially, ratifying the Convention would entail a duty to recognize certain forced migrants as refugees. Finally, the article argues that many Lebanese government officials and policymakers consider Lebanon’s accession to the Convention redundant for three key reasons. First, Lebanon applies the provisions of the Convention and Protocol on a voluntary basis, so that there is no need for ratification; secondly, Lebanon already has human rights obligations towards refugees on its territory by virtue of its membership of the United Nations and its * Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, Norway; email: Maja.Janmyr@uib.no. This research was supported by the Research Council of Norway, project No 240441/F10. The author is grateful to Alia Aoun, Kjersti G Berg, Magnus Dølerud, Lama Mourad, Dallal Stevens, and the anonymous peer reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as to the Issam Fares Institute of the American University of Beirut for being a generous host during the course of this research. International Journal of Refugee Law, 2017, Vol 29, No 3, 438–465 doi:10.1093/ijrl/eex026 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/article-abstract/29/3/438/4345649 by University of Oslo Library. Library of Medicine and Health Sciences user on 19 March 2018 ratification of a number of core human rights instruments; and, thirdly, due to the ‘crisis’ in international refugee law, in which many States appear to reject the Convention altogether, Lebanese decision makers are now questioning the relevance of these instruments. 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Refugee Convention) are the two primary international legal instruments that provide for the protection of the world’s refugees. However, in the Middle East, few States have acceded to these instruments, and no regional refugee regime such as those found in Africa or Latin America exists.1 This is seemingly paradoxical for a region in which forced migration has long been a standard element of life, and where refugees may even be seen as a ‘defining feature’.2 In the literature, significant work has been done to explain Middle Eastern States’ non-commitment to international refugee law.3 However, few studies have explored the particular circumstances of any one of these States.4 It is arguable that the reasons for non-accession to the Convention vary between States, and, although some explanations may be valid throughout the region, important nuances may be lost by viewing these States as a group. This article intends to address this gap in the literature by providing an examination of the key arguments used by one of these States – Lebanon – to ‘legitimize’ its rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Unlike many other States in the region, Lebanon engaged actively in the establishment of the international refugee regime. In addition, while many refugee populations in Lebanon have historically been marginalized and mistreated,5 the international community has often lauded the country’s approach to refugees. In 2014, for example, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General stated that, ‘Lebanon is a key pillar in the international framework for the protection of Syrian refugees, and without it, that entire system would collapse’.6 Indeed, a strong national myth in Lebanon identifies it as the cradle of international human rights, and the country, with its perceived geography, 1 Although attempts were made in 1992 with the drafting of the Declaration of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World. In the end, the Declaration has failed to be influential, endorsed only by Egypt. 2 R Zaiotti, ‘Dealing with Non-Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East: Policies and Practices in an Uncertain Environment’ (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 333, 333. See also D Chatty, Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press 2010). 3 See generally D Stevens, ‘Legal Status, Labelling, and Protection: The Case of Iraqi “Refugees” in Jordan’ (2013) 25 International Journal of Refugee Law 1; Zaiotti (n 2); M Kagan, ‘The UN “Surrogate State” and the Foundation of Refugee Policy in the Middle East’ (2012) 18 University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 307. 4 For an important exception, see Stevens (n 3). 5 N Erakat, ‘Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during Secondary Forced Displacement’ (2014) 26 International Journal of Refugee Law 581; F De Bel Air, ‘Migration Profile: Lebanon’ (European University Institute, 2017/12) 4. 6 ‘Lebanon Cannot Bear Brunt of Syrian Refugee Crisis Alone, UN Relief Official Warns’ (UN News Centre, 18 March 2014). Lebanon’s Rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention • 439 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/article-abstract/29/3/438/4345649 by University of Oslo Library. Library of Medicine and Health Sciences user on 19 March 2018 diversity, freedom, and openness, is widely believed to have historically attracted those seeking refuge from persecution.7 Today, Lebanon hosts the highest number of refugees in the world in proportion to its estimated population size of 6.2 million.8 With 1,011,366 registered Syrian refugees in December 2016, Syrians represent the vast majority of refugees in the country.9 There are also an estimated 504,000 Palestine refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and 42,000 Palestine refugees from Syria (PRS), in addition to a mere 16,000 from countries such as Ethiopia, Iraq, and Sudan.10 Despite these large numbers, the Lebanese government insists that it is not a country of asylum, and rejects, in principle, the local integration of refugees. This approach can be traced back to the Lebanese Constitution of 1926 (as amended in 1990), which appears to prohibit any permanent settlement of foreigners. It is also cemented in the key document laying out the UN and government response to the country’s Syrian refugee presence, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), which states that: ‘Lebanon is neither a country of asylum, nor a final destination for refugees, let alone a country of resettlement’.11 The unwillingness to host refugees is furthermore reflected in the lack of formal domestic refugee legislation. Asylum issues are instead attended to through immigration laws. The 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country12 contains six articles relating to asylum. The asylum provisions in the 1962 Law on Entry and Exit have only been applied once since the end of 7 See generally I Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon (Routledge 2014); W Harris, The New Face of Lebanon: History’s Revenge (Markus Wiener Publishers 2006). 8 CIA, The World Factbook accessed 24 October 2016. This figure is nevertheless disputed. For a discussion, see De Bel Air (n 5) 1. 9 The true number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is nevertheless disputed, following the government’s decision in May 2015 to suspend UNHCR’s registration of Syrian refugees. M Janmyr, ‘Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’ (2016) 35 Refugee Survey Quarterly 58, 66. 10 UNHCR, ‘The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’ (2016) 2 accessed 29 May 2017. Other sources suggest that the number of Palestine refugees in Lebanon may be considerably lower; while 400,000 refugees were registered with UNRWA in 2010, a survey that same year estimated that the number of Palestine refugees effectively residing in the country was only 260,000 to 280,000. See J Chaaban and others, ‘Socio-Economic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon’ (American University of Beirut (AUB) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) 2010) x accessed 29 May

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没有庇护国：“合法化”黎巴嫩拒绝 1951 年难民公约

各国如何将其不批准 1951 年《难民地位公约》和 1967 年《难民地位议定书》的行为“合法化”？本文考察了黎巴嫩的案例，该国因其对难民的慷慨而经常受到国际社会的称赞，目前按照其人口规模的比例，它是世界上收容难民人数最多的国家。虽然黎巴嫩积极参与建立国际难民制度，但长期以来一直坚称自己不是庇护国，并坚决拒绝批准主要的难民法文书。基于 10 个月的实地研究，本文就黎巴嫩为何继续抵制批准 1951 年难民公约及其议定书提出了四个论点。首先，它认为有一个广泛而真实的，或者只是政治上的权宜之计，《公约》附带的义务的不确定性。这包括相信《公约》要求黎巴嫩允许难民在其领土上永久定居。其次，它认为，将难民的责任转移到联合国难民事务高级专员公署等第三方，给黎巴嫩带来了明显的优势，使其不太愿意加入公约。第三，它认为阿拉伯国家之间的“睦邻”原则认为黎巴嫩不应使用“难民”一词，因为这样做会使国家陷入可能违反睦邻原则的境地；从本质上讲，批准该公约意味着有义务承认某些被迫移民为难民。最后，文章认为，许多黎巴嫩政府官员和决策者认为黎巴嫩加入该公约是多余的，主要有以下三个原因。第一，黎巴嫩在自愿基础上适用公约和议定书的条款，因此不需要批准；其次，黎巴嫩由于是联合国会员国及其 * 挪威卑尔根大学法学院，已经对其领土上的难民负有人权义务；电子邮件：Maja.Janmyr@uib.no。这项研究得到了挪威研究委员会的支持，项目编号 240441/F10。作者感谢 Alia Aoun、Kjersti G Berg、Magnus Dølerud、Lama Mourad、Dallal Stevens 和匿名同行评审员对本文早期草稿的有益评论，以及贝鲁特美国大学 Issam Fares 研究所在本研究过程中的慷慨接待。International Journal of Refugee Law, 2017, Vol 29, No 3, 438–465 doi:10.1093/ijrl/eex026 从 https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/article-abstract/29/3/438/4345649 下载奥斯陆大学图书馆。医学与健康科学图书馆用户于 2018 年 3 月 19 日批准了多项核心人权文书；第三，由于国际难民法中的“危机”，许多国家似乎完全拒绝该公约，黎巴嫩决策者现在质疑这些文书的相关性。1 . 引言 1951 年关于难民地位的公约和 1967 年关于难民地位的议定书（1951 年难民公约）是规定保护世界难民的两项主要国际法律文书。然而，在中东，很少有国家加入这些文书，也不存在像非洲或拉丁美洲那样的区域难民制度。 1 这对于一个长期以来一直是强迫移民标准要素的地区来说似乎是自相矛盾的。 2 在文献中，已经做了大量工作来解释中东国家对国际难民法的不承诺。3 然而，很少有研究探讨特殊情况这些州中的任何一个。4 不加入公约的原因因国家而异是有争议的，尽管某些解释在整个地区可能是有效的，但将这些国家视为一个群体可能会丢失重要的细微差别。本文旨在通过审查这些国家之一——黎巴嫩——用来“合法化”其拒绝 1951 年难民公约的关键论点来解决文献中的这一空白。与该地区许多其他国家不同，黎巴嫩积极参与建立国际难民制度。此外，虽然黎巴嫩的许多难民人口历来被边缘化和虐待，5 但国际社会经常称赞该国对待难民的态度。例如，2014 年，联合国 (UN) 秘书长表示，“黎巴嫩是保护叙利亚难民的国际框架中的一个关键支柱，没有它，整个系统就会崩溃”。6 事实上，黎巴嫩的一个强大民族神话将其认定为国际人权的摇篮，该国1992 年尝试起草阿拉伯世界难民和流离失所者宣言。最终，《宣言》没有产生影响，只得到埃及的认可。2 R Zaiotti，“在中东处理非巴勒斯坦难民：不确定环境中的政策和做法”（2006 年） 18 国际难民法杂志 333、333。另见 D Chatty，现代中东的流离失所和剥夺（剑桥大学出版社 2010 年）。3 一般见 D Stevens, 'Legal Status, Labelling, 和保护：约旦的伊拉克“难民”案（2013 年）25 International Journal of Refugee Law 1；扎约蒂 (n 2); M Kagan，“联合国“替代国”和中东难民政策基金会（2012 年） 18 加州大学戴维斯分校国际法与政策杂志 307。4 重要的例外情况，见史蒂文斯 (n 3)。5 N Erakat，“巴勒斯坦难民和叙利亚起义：填补二次被迫流离失所期间的保护差距”（2014 年）26 国际难民法杂志 581；F De Bel Air，“移民概况：黎巴嫩”（欧洲大学研究所，2017/12）4. 6“黎巴嫩无法独自承受叙利亚难民危机，联合国救济官员警告”（联合国新闻中心，2014 年 3 月 18 日）。黎巴嫩拒绝 1951 年难民公约 • 439 下载自 https://academic.oup。com/ijrl/article-abstract/29/3/438/4345649，奥斯陆大学图书馆。医学与健康科学图书馆用户 2018 年 3 月 19 日，人们普遍认为，多样性、自由和开放性历来吸引了那些寻求庇护以免受迫害的人。 7 今天，黎巴嫩收容了世界上最多的难民，占其估计人口的比例620 万。8 2016 年 12 月登记的叙利亚难民为 1,011,366 名，占该国难民的绝大多数。9 估计还有 504,000 名巴勒斯坦难民在联合国救济和工程处（UNRWA）登记，42,000 名巴勒斯坦难民来自叙利亚 (PRS) 的难民，以及来自埃塞俄比亚、伊拉克和苏丹等国家的 16,000 名难民。 10 尽管人数众多，黎巴嫩政府坚称它不是庇护国，原则上拒绝难民就地融合。这种做法可以追溯到 1926 年的黎巴嫩宪法（1990 年修订），该宪法似乎禁止外国人永久定居。联合国和政府应对该国叙利亚难民存在的关键文件黎巴嫩危机应对计划 (LCRP) 也巩固了这一点，其中指出：“黎巴嫩既不是庇护国，也不是难民的最终目的地。 ，更不用说重新安置的国家了。”11 不愿意收容难民还体现在缺乏正式的国内难民立法上。庇护问题改为通过移民法处理。1962 年关于外国人在黎巴嫩入境和逗留及出境的法律12 包含六项与庇护有关的条款。1962 年《入境和出境法》中的庇护条款自 7 年底以来仅适用过一次 参见 I Salamey，黎巴嫩政府和政治 (Routledge 2014)；W Harris，黎巴嫩的新面孔：历史的复仇（Markus Wiener Publishers 2006）。8 中央情报局，2016 年 10 月 24 日访问的世界概况。然而，这个数字存在争议。有关讨论，请参阅 De Bel Air (n 5) 1。 9 然而，在政府于 2015 年 5 月决定暂停难民署对叙利亚难民的登记后，黎巴嫩境内叙利亚难民的真实人数仍存在争议。M Janmyr，“流亡中的不稳定：黎巴嫩境内叙利亚难民的法律地位”（2016 年）35 难民调查季刊 58、66。10 联合国难民署，2017 年 5 月 29 日访问的“黎巴嫩境内巴勒斯坦难民的情况”（2016 年）2。其他消息来源表明，黎巴嫩境内的巴勒斯坦难民人数可能要低得多；虽然 2010 年有 400,000 名难民在近东救济工程处登记，但同年的一项调查估计，实际居住在该国的巴勒斯坦难民人数仅为 260,000 至 280,000。见 J Chaaban 等人，“黎巴嫩巴勒斯坦难民的社会经济调查”（贝鲁特美国大学 (AUB) 和联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处 (UNRWA) 2010）x 于 5 月 29 日访问 同年的一项调查估计，实际居住在该国的巴勒斯坦难民人数仅为 260,000 至 280,000。见 J Chaaban 等人，“黎巴嫩巴勒斯坦难民的社会经济调查”（贝鲁特美国大学 (AUB) 和联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处 (UNRWA) 2010）x 于 5 月 29 日访问 同年的一项调查估计，实际居住在该国的巴勒斯坦难民人数仅为 260,000 至 280,000。见 J Chaaban 等人，“黎巴嫩巴勒斯坦难民的社会经济调查”（贝鲁特美国大学 (AUB) 和联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处 (UNRWA) 2010）x 于 5 月 29 日访问