The existing corporate governance literature focuses on a principal–agent model or a principal–principal model which demonstrate two-way conflicts. This study seeks to understand the emergence of a three-way principal–agent–principal conflict between the controlling/promoter shareholder, the professional manager and the minority shareholders in emerging market family-controlled firms which are professionalizing their management. Using the case study method, this article proves that in the listed emerging market firms, the professional manager gets empowered under a specific internal governance structure as the institutions of external governance become effective. This leads to a three-way principal–agent–principal conflict between the controlling/promoter shareholder, the professional manager and the minority shareholders. A principal–agent–principal model in the emerging markets changes the very basics of corporate governance framework and opens up new research avenues in the field of corporate governance. The evolvement of the three-way conflict might call for unique regulations to deal with corporate governance problems in the emerging markets.

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印度委托代理模式的出现：以Infosys Ltd为例

现有的公司治理文献集中于证明双向冲突的委托人-代理人模型或委托人-主要模型。本研究旨在了解新兴市场家族控制公司中控制/发起人的股东，职业经理人和少数股东之间的三方委托-代理-主要冲突的出现，这些家族正在使他们的管理专业化。本文使用案例研究方法证明，在上市的新兴市场公司中，随着外部治理制度的生效，职业经理人在特定的内部治理结构下获得了授权。这导致控制/发起人股东，职业经理人和少数股东之间出现三方委托-代理-主要冲突。新兴市场中的委托-代理-主要模型改变了公司治理框架的基础，并开辟了公司治理领域的新研究途径。三方冲突的演变可能需要独特的法规来应对新兴市场中的公司治理问题。