In general, a conviction may be based on a single piece of evidence or a single testimony if the court is convinced that it proves the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions special cases were established by statute and case law in which a single piece of evidence cannot suffice to prove a defendant’s guilt and additional evidence is required to support the main evidence. This rule, known as the Corroborative Rule (hereinafter ‘the rule’ or ‘CR’) constitutes a barrier against conviction on the basis of individual evidence, without the judge or jury cautioning themselves against reliance on a single piece of evidence in order to convict the accused. In general, the requirement for additional evidence exists in cases where there is a single piece of incriminating evidence, but there is concern regarding its reliability. In order to reduce the risk of a mistake that will lead to a false conviction (conviction of an innocent defendant), the law requires additional evidence as a condition for conviction. The first purpose of this article is to provide a comparative-descriptive perspective on the CR as practised in Anglo-American and Israeli law. While in continental law a defendant’s conviction is not subject to any requirement for a specific quantity of evidence, in Anglo-American law there is a clear trend to reduce the application of a requirement for additional evidence. Yet in Israeli law, an opposite trend is evident, expressed in increased application of the Corroborative Rule in order to convict the accused. The second purpose of the article is to undertake a critical examination of the theoretical infrastructure underpinning the CR. According to this infrastructure, the justification for the CR is epistemic and relates, as a rule, to testimony whose reliability is, a priori, dubious. Thus the CR is linked to one of the purposes of some of the rules of criminal proceedings, which is to prevent the conviction of innocent defendants. However, at the same time, the CR restricts judicial discretion and harms the prosecutor’s and the court’s ability to ensure conviction of guilty defendants, even in cases where there is a single piece of evidence, which the court trusts. The first section provides a comparison of the use of the CR in English, Canadian, Scottish, American and Israeli law. The second section is devoted to the description of the theoretical infrastructure of the CR, while the third section contains a critical discussion on both the theoretical infrastructure described in the second section and also the requirement for evidential supplements, in general. To conclude the article, I provide a summary of its contents.

中文翻译：

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从比较和批判的角度看“确证规则”

一般而言，如果法院确信它证明被告有罪，排除了合理怀疑，则定罪可以基于单个证据或单个证词。然而，在一些司法管辖区，成文法和判例法规定了特殊案件，其中单条证据不足以证明被告有罪，需要额外的证据来支持主要证据。这条被称为佐证规则（以下简称“规则”或“CR”）的规则构成了根据个人证据定罪的障碍，法官或陪审团没有警告自己不要依赖单一证据来定罪被告人。一般而言，在有单项犯罪证据的情况下，需要额外的证据，但其可靠性令人担忧。为了降低错误导致错误定罪（无辜被告定罪）的风险，法律要求额外的证据作为定罪的条件。本文的第一个目的是对英美和以色列法律中实行的 CR 提供比较描述性的观点。虽然在大陆法中，被告的定罪不受对特定数量证据的任何要求的约束，但在英美法中，有明显的趋势是减少对额外证据要求的适用。然而，在以色列法律中，一个相反的趋势是明显的，表现为越来越多地适用确证规则以将被告定罪。本文的第二个目的是对支撑 CR 的理论基础结构进行批判性检查。根据这种基础结构，CR 的理由是认知的，并且通常与可靠性先验可疑的证词有关。因此，CR 与某些刑事诉讼规则的目的之一有关，即防止无辜被告被定罪。然而，与此同时，《刑事诉讼法》限制了司法自由裁量权，损害了检察官和法院确保有罪被告定罪的能力，即使是在法院信任的单一证据的情况下。第一部分比较了 CR 在英国、加拿大、苏格兰、美国和以色列法律中的使用。第二部分专门描述 CR 的理论基础结构，而第三部分包含对第二部分中描述的理论基础结构以及一般证据补充要求的批判性讨论。为了结束这篇文章，我提供了其内容的摘要。