This paper responds to Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo's essay, “Relative Plausibility and its Critics.” In short, Profs. Allen and Pardo succeed on one front but fail on another. They succeed in demonstrating that “probabilism” is not a conceptually or phenomenologically convincing model of how human fact-finders in the real world carry out their task. They fail, however, in demonstrating that probabilism is inadequate as an idealized model of human fact-finding – and to that extent, their analysis falls short of establishing the abstract primacy of “explanationism,” even if it clarifies the latter's content and (limited) utility.

中文翻译：

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从未有过的概率论辩论？

本文是对 Ronald Allen 和 Michael Pardo 的文章“相对合理性及其批评者”的回应。简而言之，Profs。艾伦和帕尔多在一个方面取得了成功，但在另一方面却失败了。他们成功地证明，“概率论”并不是一个概念上或现象学上令人信服的模型，说明现实世界中的人类事实发现者如何执行他们的任务。然而，他们未能证明概率论作为人类事实调查的理想化模型是不够的——因此，他们的分析未能确立“解释主义”的抽象首要地位，即使它澄清了后者的内容和（有限的） ） 公用事业。