According to Allen and Pardo, the field of evidence law has experienced a revolution -in Kuhn's sense- from probabilism to explanationism, which they identify with the relative plausibility theory. The explanationist revolution, argue Allen and Pardo, has placed explanationist -rather than probabilistic criteria- at the core of the fact-finding process and, in contrast to probabilism, has advanced a comparative understanding of the theory of legal proof. This paper develops an alternative interpretation of the explanationist revolution in evidence law. First, it elaborates on the concept of legal revolution and argues that it involves a kind of shift that is best characterized as a Hacking -rather than a Kuhnean- type of revolution and, thus, as an ‘emplacement’ instead of a ‘replacement’ revolution. Second, it claims that the shift from probabilism to explanationism involves a deep -genuinely revolutionary- change in the conception of rationality that is taken to govern the processes of evidence and legal proof. Other differences between probabilistim and explanationism, such as those mentioned by Allen and Pardo, are not central to the revolutionary shift, but rather emanate from this basic distinction. Last, it argues that the explanationist paradigm embraces, but cannot be reduced to, the relative plausibility theory; the identification of explanationism with the relative plausibility theory occludes the richness and possibilities harboured by the new, explanationist, paradigm.

中文翻译：

---

证据法中的解释主义革命

根据艾伦和帕尔多的说法，证据法领域经历了一场革命——在库恩的意义上——从概率论到解释论，他们将其视为相对合理性理论。Allen 和 Pardo 认为，解释主义革命将解释主义——而不是概率标准——置于事实调查过程的核心，与概率主义相反，它促进了对法律证明理论的比较理解。本文对证据法中的解释主义革命提出了另一种解释。首先，它详细阐述了法律革命的概念，并认为它涉及一种最能被描述为 Hacking 而非 Kuhnean 类型革命的转变，因此，它是一种“进驻”而不是“替代”革命。第二，它声称，从概率论到解释论的转变涉及理性概念的深刻——真正革命性的——变化，理性概念被用来支配证据和法律证明的过程。概率论和解释论之间的其他差异，例如艾伦和帕尔多提到的那些差异，并不是革命性转变的核心，而是源于这种基本区别。最后，它认为解释主义范式包含但不能简化为相对合理性理论；解释主义与相对合理性理论的认同，掩盖了新的解释主义范式所蕴含的丰富性和可能性。概率论和解释论之间的其他差异，例如艾伦和帕尔多提到的那些差异，并不是革命性转变的核心，而是源于这种基本区别。最后，它认为解释主义范式包含但不能简化为相对合理性理论；解释主义与相对合理性理论的认同，掩盖了新的解释主义范式所蕴含的丰富性和可能性。概率论和解释论之间的其他差异，例如艾伦和帕尔多提到的那些差异，并不是革命性转变的核心，而是源于这种基本区别。最后，它认为解释主义范式包含但不能简化为相对合理性理论；解释主义与相对合理性理论的认同，掩盖了新的解释主义范式所蕴含的丰富性和可能性。