The new evidence scholarship addresses three distinct approaches: legal probabilism, Bayesian decision theory and relative plausibility theory. Each has major insights to offer, but none seems satisfactory as it stands. This paper proposes that relative plausibility theory be modified in two substantial ways. The first is by defining its key concept of plausibility, hitherto treated as primitive, by generalising the standard axioms of probability. The second is by complementing the descriptive component of the theory with a normative decision theory adapted to legal process. Because this version of decision theory is based on plausibilities rather than probabilities, it generates plausibilistic expectations as outputs. Because these outputs are comparable, they function as relative plausibilities. Hence the resulting framework is an extension of relative plausibility theory, but it retains deep ties to legal probabilism, through the proposed definition of plausibility, and to Bayesian decision theory, through the normative use of decision theory.

中文翻译：

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重启新证据奖学金

新的证据研究解决了三种不同的方法：法律概率论、贝叶斯决策理论和相对合理性理论。每个人都可以提供重要的见解，但似乎没有一个是令人满意的。本文提出相对合理性理论可以通过两种实质性的方式进行修改。第一个是通过概括概率的标准公理来定义其迄今为止被视为原始的似是而非的关键概念。第二种是通过适用于法律程序的规范性决策理论来补充该理论的描述性成分。因为这个版本的决策理论基于合理性而不是概率，所以它产生合理的期望作为输出。由于这些输出具有可比性，因此它们具有相对合理性。