In defense of their “explanatory” theory of the proof process, Professors Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo maintain that a successful theory of this kind should correspond to the way that jurors actually reason, to the structure of American trials, and to typical jury instructions. They also demand that such a theory should be normatively defensible. This response suggests that using a single theory to cover such disparate ground obscures more than it clarifies, given the important gaps between psychological, doctrinal, and normative aspects of the fact-finding process.

中文翻译：

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关于证明过程单一模型的局限性

Ronald Allen 和 Michael Pardo 教授在为他们的证明过程的“解释性”理论辩护时坚持认为，这种成功的理论应该符合陪审员实际推理的方式、美国审判的结构以及典型的陪审团指令。他们还要求这样的理论应该在规范上站得住脚。这一回应表明，鉴于实况调查过程的心理、教义和规范方面之间存在重大差距，使用单一理论来涵盖如此不同的基础会模糊而不是澄清。